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Special Report for the President 


Tom Charles Huston 

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E.0. 12958. as amended. Sect 3.5 . 

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A. Influence of the Communist Party, USA 

B. Influence of the Progressive Labor Party 

C. Influence of the Socialist Workers Party 


A. Soviet Ideological Attitude toward the U.S. 
Protest Movement 

B. Role of Soviet Bloc Intelligence 

C. Chinese Ideological Attitude toward the U.S. 
Protest Movement 

D. Role of the Chinese Intelligence Service 

E. Other Chinese Support Activities 

F. Cuban Ideological Attitude toward the U.S. 
Protest Movement 

G. Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service 
H. Other Cuban Support Activities 





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TAB As- Contacts Between U.S. Peace Movement and 
• „ , Foreign Communist Organizations in 

Preparation for Pentagon Peace Demonstration 

of 21 October 196? kO 

TAB B - International Conferences Attended "by 

Representatives of U.S. Revolutionary Protest 
Movement ^ 2 

TAB C - Visits to the United States "by Foreign 

Revolutionaries ^9 

TAB D - Organizational Appendix 50 




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# # # 

- The President's initial inquiry was limited to the question, 
Does the United States Government have iron-clad proof that foreign 
Communist powers are helping to finance campus disorders in this 
country? The answer to that question is deceptively simple: No, we 
do not have "iron- clad" proof. However, we do have substantial proof * 
that foreign Communists are providing some funds to some organizations 
for the purpose of fostering domestic disorder, not only on the campus, 
hut in the larger community as well. 

The magnitude of the threat of revolutionary violence in America 
cannot accurately he measured by the degree of financial support 
revolutionary organizations are receiving from abroad. Other weapons 
in the revolutionary arsenal are as powerful as money; for example, the 
"thoughti' of Mao Tse-tung are mental missiles launched against the minds 
of thousands of young Americans and can prove as fatal as bullets. 
Communist revolution bagins in the mind, not in the stomach; it is among 
the best educated that the spark of Communist revolution is ignited, and 
it should not be surprising that the leadership of the New Left and the 
black extremist movement are well-educated, middle-class "intellectuals." 

We have overwhelming evidence that the revolutionary protest 
movement in this country is receiving myriad types of support from foreign 
Communists. We have evidence of efforts to encourage violence, to recruit 
espionage agents, to coordinate international opposition to U.S. foreign 
policy objectives, to provide guerrilla training to U.S. nationals, to 
encourage desertions from the U.S. Armed Forces, and to generally encourage 
and support revolutionary action in the United States. The evidence we have 
available supports, I believe, the inference that many young Americans 
do not realize the extent to which they are being used to further the 
objectives of international Communism and, perhaps, the inference that 
,^^ most Americans do not realize the extent to which the so-called "protest 
CO movement" in this country is influenoftlby, and susceptible to the control 
of, foreign Communist powers. 

Although revolutionary violence in America is one of the most 
pressing domestic problems facing the nation, this is the first time that 
an effort has been made to prepare a comprehensive inter-agency, all-source 
intelligence estimate of support being rendered to American revolutionary 
organizations by foreign Communists. For that reason, I have deliberately 
prepared a detailed analysis of the evidence presently available on the 
subject. I believe that the information contained in this report is 
sufficiently important to justify the President's attention. However, 
since it is so lengthy, the President may prefer to read only the most 
significant portions. 



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I have prepared a summary of findings and recommendations which 
will give, the President a "brief resume of the most significant findings. 
In addition to this summary, I would recommend that the President also 
read the following sections: 

,, :: ' I. A - Influence of the Communist Party, USA, at page .5. 

I.B - Influence of the Progressive Labor Party, at page 7. 

II. E. - Other Chinese Communist Support Activities, 
at page 18. . ; 

II. H.-- Other Cuban Support Activities, at page 2k. 

III. - Communist Financial Support of U.S. Revolutionary 

Organizations, at page 28. 

IV. - Contacts Between Leaders of the Revolutionary Protest 

Movement and Representatives of Foreign Communist 
Groups, at page 3^. 

V. - Observations and Conclusions, at page 36. 






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I. Findings 

' (l) The Communist Party, USA has attempted to penetrate and take 
control of New Left and "black militant groups, trot thus far has been 

(2) The Progressive Labor Party (the Chinese Communist party in 
the U. S. ) has successfully penetrated the Students for a Democratic 
Society and now controls a. significant number of its local 
chapters. It had a majority of the delegates at the SDS national 
convention held in June, and as a result of its attempt to seize control, 
succeeded in splitting the organization^ . 

(3) Progressive Labor has close ties with Peking and has 
received substantial financial support from the Chinese in the last two 
years. During the period 1963-I965, the party also received financial 
support from Cuba. 

^ W The Socialist Workers Party (a Trotskyite organization) 

>ii ) has played a major role in organizing antiwar activities throughout the 
"^ country and in organizing student disorders at : Berkeley. 


(5) For a number 1 of years Mao Tse-tung and Fidel Castro have 
publicly expressed support for the New Left and black extremist movements 
in this country. In June I969, Leonid Brezhnev at the international 
conference of the Communist Parties in Moscow set forth a new Moscow line 
f»sj which suggests a new awareness on the part of the Soviets of the 
;-— - revolutionary potential in the New Left and black extremist movements in 
iZZ this country. 

(6) Although the Soviets have not made significant efforts to 
C/5 date to exploits/the situation in the U.S., the Chinese and Cubans have. 

In addition toT£4l£ support of the Progressive Labor Party, the Chinese 
have established good contacts with the black extremists. Castro now 
appears to be placing top priority on encouraging the activities of 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Black Panthers. 
We have considerable evidence that Castro has promised increased 
financial support for these groups as well as revolutionary training for 
its cadres. 

(7) There is overwhelming evidence pointing to close cooperation 
and coordination between the U.S. "peace movement" and the North Vietnamese 
and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. As recently as May 
of this year, U.S. citizens met with officials of North Vietnam and the 
NLF to consider ways to revitalize the antiwar movement in this country. 




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(8) The intelligence community is not bringing to bear upon this 
problem all the resources presently or potentially available. As a 
i , consequence, there are significant gaps in our knowledge of the scope 
and nature of .many important aspects of the relationship between U.S. 
: revolutionary organizations and foreign Communist powers. 

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" (9) There is inadequate coordination within the intelligence 
community in dealing with this problem and a failure on the part of the 
community to work jointly to insure that all important targets are fully 
covered and all resources adequately exploited. 

(l6) Although the increasing revolutionary violence in this country 
poses a major threat to our national security, no intelligence collection 
priorities have been established, no effort has been made to coordinate and 
analyze the intelligence we currently have available, and no effort has 
been made to devise realistic and effective countermeasures to head off 
the clear threat posed by increasing Communist support for, influence 
over, and likely control of the revolutionary protest movement in this 

II. Recommendations . 

) (l) That, the President direct the intelligence community to devise 

a detailed plan for increasing the collection efforts targeted against 
the U»S. revolutionary protest movement and its contacts with foreign 
_^ Communists. Because of the institutional jealousies within the intelligence 
^ community, I believe this could best be dope if an inter-agency task force 
^ were established under the chairmanship of an individual not a member 
^ of any of the agencies involved in the study. 

(2) That, the President direct that a review be conducted of the 
f^r\ resources potentially available government-wide which could be utilized 

t 1 j in the formulation of a solution to the problem of increasing revolutionary 
h»s| violence in America. 

■— - (3) That, the President direct that a study be made to determine 

exactly who in the government is presently involved in programs relating 
to this problem, what those programs are, and how effective they have been. 

£^ Particular attention should be given to the question of whether diffused 
responsibility is largely responsible for the government's inability to 
. date to develop countermeasures against the activities of revolutionary 
organizations in this country. 

(k) That, the President consider attaching a high priority to 
this problem. 

(5) That, the President not release the contents of. this report 
without first affording an opportunity for it to be sanitized in order to 
v ^ avoid compromising the sensitive sources of much of the information 
contained herein. 

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Foreign Communist support of revolutionary protest movements in 
the United States can be manifested in a number of ways, not the least 
important of -which is the role played by the domestic Communist Left 
in organizing, supporting, and providing leadership and direction to 
the revolutionary activity which is underway in this country. 

Since, the Communist Party, USA is under the domination and 
control of the Soviet Union, it can be used increasingly as a vehicle 
to support these movements if the Soviet Union decides this is an 
appropriate course of action. Similarly, the Progressive Labor Party 
and other pro-Chinese Communist groups can be utilized by Communist China 
as a channel for rendering support to protest movements in the United 
States. And what might be called the "third force" in international 
j Communist circles -- Trotskyism — is also represented in this country 

i by the Socialist Workers Party which has played a major role in the anti- 

! war protest movement. 

i The tentacles of influence reach out from the Domestic Communist 

Left and encompass virtually all of the New Left and Black Power groups. 


A. Influence of the Communist Party, USA 

"^ Since it was founded in September, 1919* the Communist Party, USA 

(CPUSA) has been unswerving in its allegiance to the Soviet Union. Over 

^ the years the Soviets have utilized the CPUSA as a possible channel for 

^" Soviet support of the current revolutionary protest movements in this- 

f-\ country. All available information derived from investigations by the 

i , | fbi indicates that while the CPUSA has made overtures to the revolutionary 

h-j protest groups active today, there has been limited acceptance of the 

j""" CPUSA by these groups. 

*H£1 In recognition of its lack of support among youthful activists on 

«SC college campuses,, the CPUSA is currently making plans to establish a 
£^ new youth group directed toward youth in industry. Party leaders, on the 
other hand, have criticized New Left groups such as the Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS) as petty bourgeois radicals. Party youth who 
have attempted to have the CPUSA relate more clearly with such groups 
have been isolated and silenced. The CPUSA theoretical organ, Political 
Affairs , in its March and April, 1969, issues, contained a two-part 
article entitled "the Student Rebellion," which clearly set out CPUSA 
opposition to the anti-Soviet, anti-CPUSA line of student protest groups. 




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Within" the past year leaders of the CPUSA in the Midwest met with 
leaders of SDS to discuss closes cooperation or possible recruitment of 
these individuals into the party. These overtures were completely 

■ rebuffed by the SDS people who stated that while there were no disagree- 
ments with CPUSA. philosophy, it is- most doubtful the CPUSA is relevant 

■ today. When it was proposed that there be some form of collectivity 
. between .the two groups, the SDS leaders replied that the CPUSA is not 

involved in SDS collectives because the CPUSA has nothing to contribute. 

- Subsequently, a leader of the SDS in conversation with leaders of 
. the CP of Illinois stated that the "Establishment" as it exists today .. 
must be changed, even if this change must be through force. He added 
that the "Establishment" must be replaced by a communist government, there 
has to be a communist party, and there has to be a communist revolution. 
However, he said that SDS is the only group- to organize the youth, thus 
rejecting the CPUSA as a possible vehicle for bringing about this 
revolution . 

The ideological rigidity of the CPUSA severiy limits the options 
open to the party in their efforts to exert influence upon the New Left. 
By virtue of its subservience to Moscow, the Party cannot adopt a more 
flexible ideological approach until authorized to do so by the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and although there are indications 
that Soviet theoreticians now recognize their lack of status in the 
revolutionary student movement in the United States and the need to 
become influential in the current ideological struggle in order to 
orient it to Soviet style communism, it will doubtless be some time before 
Moscow develops a new line. In the meantime, the CPUSA is likely to be 

v. limited to a supporting, rather than a directing, role in the New Left 

a_ movement . 


_ With regard to the activists in the black extremist groups, the 

UJ CPUSA is under a severe strain in attempting to develop a program to attract 

P**^ these individuals while at the same time adhering to its pro-Soviet and 

j , Marxist-Leninist ideology. The fight within the CPUSA on the way in 

"-* " which to handle the black question is a bitter one and no clear-cut 

policy has been established. An attempt by black nationalists within 
the CPUSA to pass a resolution recommending that Negroes arm themselves 
' for self-defense was overwhelmingly defeated at the recent 19th 
National Convention. In addition, the pro-Maoist stance of the extremist 
Black Panther Party (BPP) is aiTathema to the pro-Soviet CPUSA. 

CPUSA leaders have stated that the Black Panther Party may be a 
vehicle to stimulate revolutionary ferment among Negro youth if the 
Panthers can be taught a true Marxist-Leninist approach. Leaders of the 
CPUSA in California have been in contact with the BPP and have assisted in 
the setting up of a defense committee for Panthers who have" been arrested. 



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However, CPUSA leaders admit that it is not possible to talk to Black Panthers 
as communists. One CPUSA member was instructed to penetrate the BPP and 
to try to put over the CPUSA. program. He did join, but when he was 
, [ '■ exposed as a CPUSA member as a result of attempting to advance CPUSA 
policies, he was expelled from membership in the Panthers. 

This does not mean that the CPUSA. is not striving to play a more 
effective role in its relationship with activists of both New Left and 
black extremist groups. Individual party members do play a role in 
the demonstrations, activities, and workings of these groups. Party 
. publications trumpet in support of all demonstrations which stir up 

discord in the United States whether it be economic, social, or against the 
war in Vietnam. But thus far, the CPUSA has not been able to take 
control of a single major New Left or black extremist organization. 
Through its own youth fronts such as the DuBois Clubs, it participates 
as an active partner in the peace movement and occasionally provides 
leadership to local campus protest movements, but its role is secondary 
at this time. And because of the FBI's top-level penetration of the 
party leadership, I am confident of our ability to keep a close watch 
upon its activities and to have adequate warning if it becomes 
increasingly successful in its effort to become the leading force behind 
the revolutionary protest movement in this country. 

\ B. Influence of the Progressive Labor Party 

Recent years have witnessed the formation of a myriad of extremist 
organizations enunciating the tenets of Communist China and Mao Tse-tung. 
^ The majority have been ineffectual paper organizations and not viable 

"^ operations. However, one group, the Progressive Labor Party (PL), is 
making significant organizational strides in major American cities and 
on a number of college campuses. 



The Progressive Labor Party was founded in I962 by extremist 

— elements of the CPUSA who were dissatisfied with CPUSA' s "revisionism" and 
P^ who advocated the following of the Chinese communist line in all areas of 
uZ. policy. It is headed by such devoted revolutionaries as Milton Rosen, 

— one-time Labor Secretary of the New York State Communist Party, who was 
^ expelled from the CPUSA for extremist views; and William Epton, who, 

following his participation in the Harlem race riot of 196^, was found 
guilty of conspiracy to riot, conspiracy to advocate criminal anarchy, 
and advocating criminal anarchy. 

With headquarters in New York City, PL has established active 
branches in a number of major metropolitan areas including Boston, Buffalo, 
Chicago, Newark, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. During 
recent months, it has made a concerted . effort to establish PL branches 
throughout the United States.. Spearheading this drive has been Walter 
Linder, National Director of the Trade Union Commission of PL and an 
expert on organization. PL is particularly interested in expanding its 


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membership on the West Coast as evidenced by the recent assignment of 
Levi Laub, a member of PL's National Committee, to Los Angeles for 
that purpose. 

" PL maintains close contact with pro-Chinese Communist groups abroad 
and its publications consistently follow the Chinese Communist line. For 
example., during early 1968 PL issued a pamphlet in which it proclaimed 
that PL is among the groups which "proudly make common cause with each 
other and with the Chinese for world revolution" and "boasted of its 
support of. the Viet Cong in defeat of our "common enemy, the United 
States ruling class . " 

Progressive Labor was assured by the Chinese in 1967 that it is 
the official Chinese Communist Party in the United States, and we have 
evidence that the Chinese have made substantial financial contributions 
to the party. 

PL leaders have been in periodic contact with Chinese Communist 
agencies and have on occasion visited the Chinese mainland. Jacob 
Rosen and Frederick Jerome, members of the PL National Committee, 
travelled to mainland China in March of this year. 

Of particular significance is PL's stepped-up efforts to extend 
its influence on college campuses, PL's' ability to seize upon situations 
ripe for violence was revealed by its role with SDS during the Columbia 
University riots, the turmoil at San Francisco State College, and 
the student unrest at the University of California at Berkeley. 



Progressive Labor is an important factor in the revolutionary 
movement in the United States not merely because it is the largest 
and most successful Maoist organization, but also because it is a well 
disciplined organization with clear objectives and the ability to 
achieve them. PL decided in 1965 to attempt a take-over of SDS. Its 
— members were instructed to infiltrate local SDS chapters and seize 
tH control of them. By the time of the 1967 SDS National Convention, PL 
°" ' controlled enough local SDS chapters that it was able to elect one of 
its members *» National Education Secretary, one of the three national 
administrative officers of SDS.. 



In December, I968, 800 individuals attended a stormy seven-day 
meeting of the SDS National Council at Ann Arbor, Michigan. The meeting 
was dominated by a prolonged struggle, which included physical altercations, 
between the SDS regulars headed by Mike Klonsky (who considers himself a 
revolutionary communist — small "c") and SDS members who were also 
members of PL. 

The PL group came to the National Council meeting prepared for a 
power play to gain control of SDS even though national officers would not 
be elected at the meeting. The struggle between the PL members and the 





SDS regulars was fought over tw© main issues — participation in demonstra- 
tions in Washington during the Presidential inauguration and the future 
composition of SDS. The fact that each of the opposing sides won one issue 
and lost the other is a fairly accurate measurement of their relative 
" strength in SDS at that time." 

' The struggle "between PL and the SDS regulars continued at a 
National Council meeting attended by more than 1,000 individuals held in 
Austin, Texas, from March. 28 through 30, 1969. At this meeting, one of 
the major topics of discussion was the form of Marxist revolutionary .. 
activity SDS. would follow. 

PL, supported by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and CPUSA 
members of SDS, advocated a student-worker alliance, i.e., a uniting of 
students on campuses and workers in industry for revolutionary purposes. 
Following Marxist teachings, PL views the "working class" (proletariat) 
as the vehicle whereby the revolution will be brought about. Hence, 
in PL eyes, SDS should aggressively endeavor to link the campus with 
the industrial workers. 

The CPUSA and the SWP (through its youth group, the Young Socialist 
Alliance) also advocate the worker- student alliance. Though the three 
Old Left parties are in violent dispute relative to their own ideological 
loyalties, being respectively pro-Peking, pro-Moscow, and Trotskyite, they 
mutually agree on the necessity for SDS to follow the historic Marxist- 
Leninist concept of achieving revolution through the class struggle based 
v on the proletariat. 

^ The question of a worker- student alliance was not resolved at the 

O National Council meeting, and when the National Convention of SDS convened 

LU in Chicago last month, the battle was resumed. Although the SDS regulars 

•^ had ample warning of the Intentions of PL, apparently they did not take the 

h^ threat seriously. However, soon after the convention opened, it became 

-~2 obvious that for the first time PL had a majority. Confronted with the 

35 inevitability of a PL takeover, the SDS regulars walked out of the 

?5 convention, keeping control of the. national office, membership records 

00 and bank account — thus maintaining effective control of the national 

This walkout apparently caught PL by surprise, and while they had 
a clear majority of delegates, and elected their own slate of national 
officers, they found themselves in effective control of only their own 
faction. They had split SDS when they had planned to take it over. 
Only time will tell whether they achieved more than a Pryrhic victory. 



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The importance of their effort, however, lies in the example which 
it offers of what well organized, disciplined cadre can do within the 
ranks of a loosely organized, ideologically -unstructured "revolutionary" 
„ organization . If the SDS regulars learned anything at all at the 

convention, it was that disciplined leadership is necessary to conduct 
■ a revolution as well as to prevent a palace coup. 

' The sophistication of the PL leadership stands in marked contrast 
to that of most SDS members. The. PL people have no idealistic hang-ups. 
They are professional revolutionaries, and they go about their work in a "business 
like manner. For example, PL was very active in the SDS disruptions at.. 
Harvard. They were in the vanguard, of those who seized the Administration 
building, but when they realized that the police were going to move in 
and arrest the protestors, they quietly left the building, conveniently 
leaving the more naive students to be arrested and to qualify as revolutionary 
martyrs . 

The Progressive Labor Party is a dedicated Maoist revolutionary 
organization which is increasingly effective. It plays a far more 
important role within the revolutionary protest movement than the CPUSA 
or any of the other Marxist- Leninist groups. It is flexible in its 
tactics, if not in its ideology; and although it has suffered a setback 
in its effort^ to seize national control of SDS, the setback is likely 
to be only temporary. Most of the disruptive activity on the campuses 
^ ) is the result of the programs of local SDS chapters, and at this time 

-^ PL controls about half of them, particularly on the East and West coasts. 
"^ PL operates from a powerful grassroots base, and Peking should have every 
reason to believe that its support of the party is paying dividends. 



C. Influence of the Socialist Workers Party 

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP), founded in 1938, is a militant 
revolutionary group based on the theories of Marx, Engels, and Lenin as 
interpreted by Leon Trotsky rather than Joseph Stalin. 

CO In addition to its avowed aim to eventually overthrow our form 

of government, the SWP's immediate objective is to hold together the 
coalition of antiwar groups prevalent in the country today. It also seeks 
public acceptability by - running candidates for political office on local, 
state and national levels. SWP candidates for President and Vice 
President were successful in having their names placed on some 19 state 
ballots during the 1968 elections. They also traveled to South Vietnam 
where they engaged in discussions with U.S. servicemen. 

The Trotskyite Fourth International (Fl), self-styled as the World 
Party of the Socialist Revolution, is headquartered in Paris and claims to 
be fighting for the realization of Leon Trotsky's ideas. The SWP was 
forced by the limitations of the Voorhis Act of 19^0 to withdraw its 
official affiliation with the FI; however the SWP maintains "fraternal ties" 
j with FI and continually has "observers" in attendance at its international 

meetings . 

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The- Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the SWP youth affiliate, was 
originally formed in 1957 by former members of socialist and communist 
. . . ' youth organizations. One of its primary purposes is to recruit youth 
into : the socialist camp who ultimately will "become members of the SWP. 
* The entire National Executive Committee of the YSA is composed of 
individuals who are" also members of the SWP. Most of the YSA chapters 
are located on or near college campuses. 

- In addition to acting as a recruiting mechanism for ultimate SWP ■ 
membership, the YSA' s current objective is to- organize, dominate, control 
and perpetuate the antiwar movement in the country. The YSA, together with 
the SWP, credit themselves with organizing a number of massive antiwar 

The YSA National Convention held in Chicago from November 28 to 
December 1, 1968, was attended by 791 registered individuals, including . 
I1O5 current active members representing 29 states and 128 cities. Guests 
came from Canada, Mexico, France, and Germany. During the four days of 
the convention, the YSA recruited approximately 60 new members. 

Because the YSA is a youth group consisting in the main of college 
students, most of its activities take place on or near college campuses. 
3; Its members have participated in many of the campus disorders which have 
> • recently swept the country. For the past several years, Peter Caejo, 

SWP National Committee member and former national officer of the YSA, has 
been the dominant leader of the campus disorders and police confrontations, 
on the campus of the University of California at Berkeley. . 

d After the French student uprising in the Spring of I968, a leader 


of the SWP stated that for years the SWP has afforded financial and 
theoretical assistance and material to maintain the Trotskyist cadre in 
France and that this assistance was paying off. 

^T In 1968, a leader of the SWP noted that the role of the student 

CO youth in France was a new element injected into the spring uprising in 
that country and that the young militants of the Trotskyite Jeunesse 
Communiste Revolutionnaire played a key role. in spite of its small 
force. He related that the role that American youth will play in the building 
of the American revolution must be similar. 

In December of 1968, fourteen YSA and/or SWP members traveled to 
Cuba as guests of the Cuban Government to join in the celebration of the 
tenth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution. Since returning from their 
one-month stay in Cuba, these individuals have participated in numerous 
lectures and discussions on college campuses throughout the- United States 
supporting Fidel Castro's revolutionary views. 






Unlike" the CPUSA and the Progressive Labor Party, the Socialist 
Workers Party does not have an ideological "motherland" abroad to which 
it can look for support. Although the SWP leaders are ardent admirers of 
Castro Cuba, the support -which they receive from Havana is limited by 
virtue of Castro's adherence to a. generally pro-Moscow line. The 
Trotskyites have been engaged- in a major ideological quarrel with Moscow 
since, the split between Stalin and Trotsky, and the SWP, as a Trotskyite 
party," does not have the active support of a single Communist country. 
However, it maintains close contacts with revolutionary groups throughout 
the world, particularly in Western Europe. It has particularly good 
contacts with the young revolutionary movements in France and West 
Germany. Although not subject to control by a foreign power or likely 
to receive substantial support from a Communist government, it is 
nevertheless a dedicated and effective revolutionary communist organization 
that occupies a central role in the nation-wide antiwar protest movement. 

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A. Soviet Ideological Attitude toward the U.S. Protest Movement . 

■ Soviet attitudes toward the revolutionary protest movement in this 
country in the future will probably he guided hy the June 17, 19-69, declaration 
of the conference of Communist parties which sets forth the U.S. as the 
main enemy, and views favorably the opposition of radical U.S. youth and 
students to the Vietnam war, the draft, racism, and "monopoly control of 
the universities." The declaration expresses strong support for the 
struggle of the Negro population of the U.S. for their rights," and 
urges Communist parties to devote considerable attention to work 
among students. 

Until the fall of 1968 when the Soviets tried to formulate a more 
positive approach to the youth movement, Soviet propaganda sought to 
explain all U.S. protest and unrest in classical Communist terms, and 
avoided giving publicity to extremist groups. The Soviets were noticeably 
concerned over the threat of contagion from undisciplined Western youth 
) movements and over the disruptive impact of such groups on orthodox 
Communist parties. 

^ Hitherto, the Soviets have had a shifting and ambivalent .attitude 

"^ ~ toward all student protest activities in the West, including the United 
v States. 

On the one hand, commentators have applauded student protest 
^ activity as proof of the weaknesses and contradictions of capitalist society 
and as a natural prelude to the general revolution which will destroy 
that society. On the other hand, they have decried the youths' disregard of 
Soviet interests and direction and have warned that the youth will be 
really effective only when they submit to the discipline of the workers' move- 
ment and the theory of Marxism-Leninism. 

Soviet discussion of foreign youth tends to lump United States and 
Western European youth together as motivated by similar concerns' and 
influenced by similar ideologies. Thus, the philosopher Herbert Marcuse, 
conveniently of German birth and American residence,, is seen as the spiritual 
father of the New Left in both the U.S. and Western Europe. 

The student role in large-scale disturbances in Europe in early 
1968, especially in the events of May in Paris, forced the -issue in Moscow 
of what policy to adopt toward the movement beyond the general sympathy that 
had always been expressed on the subject of the alienation, of youth in 

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the West. The response came in the form of an article in Prayda in May 
1968 by commentator Tury Zhukov/ who gave a detailed critique of Marcuse's 
theories and castigated his young followers, including Cohn-Bendit, as 
1 .. ' "werewolves." Foreign policy considerations, especially the interest of 
the French Qommunist party, seem to have largely determined this negative 
■ ' reaction . 

' Soviet officials, however, were clearly surprised and troubled by 
the effectiveness of the student revolt and the prospect it would usurp 
the revolutionary role in the West from the Communist parties. The 
■ Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, A.M. Rumyantsev, admitted 
in September 1968 that "the latest events in France . . . proved to be a 
surprise in many ways for the Soviet scientific workers." A professor 
wrote in the Soviet press in November 1968 that "many Communist parties 
■ admit they underestimated the potentialities of the student movement. 

Since the fall of 1968, press articles have tried to formulate a more 
positive approach to the youth movements of the West. They developed many 
' of the themes expressed by the physicist Petr Kapitsa to the Presidium of the 
Academy of Sciences in February 1969 and by Brezhnev in June 1969. While 
still condemning Marcuse's theories and the anarchistic elements of the 
students' activities, commentators have seen the "ideological fog in 
students' heads" as natural and understandable. More important in the 
§ commentator's eyes was youth's rejection of capitalist society. Like 

Kapitsa and Brezhnev, they found that ideological and spiritual disaffection 
were more important causes of student protest than material conditions. The 
commentators still maintained, however, that the potential of the young • 
activists could only be realized when they accepted the guidance of the 
workers' movement and Marxist-Leninist teachings, thereby implying the 

^ current independence of the students from Soviet influence. 

Ui ' 

~ A Radio Moscow broadcast beamed to Yugoslavia on June 23, 19^9 

I — assailed Marcuse and his concept that youth, not the workers, are the motive 
^ force of revolution. In a rare Soviet mention of the SDS, it noted that 
<T "some" members of this organization have expressed dissatisfaction with 
So Marcuse's view and favor an alliance with the working class — a more 
mighty revolutionary force in capitalist society." 

Kapitsa' s departure from other writers on the subject is his explicit 
criticism of Soviet ideologists for their isolation from foreign revolutionary 
movements and the suggestion that they could fall behind progressive thought 
in the West. Here Kapitsa is expressing the fears of liberals m the 
Soviet Union that the dogmatic stance of the present regime is isolating 
their country from progressive movements in the rest of the world. A 
similar spirit marks the essay by Kapitsa 's fellow physicist Audrey 
Sakharov, which appeared in the West in July 1968. 

The difficulty for the regime is that the attempt to reconcile the 
student movement in the U.S. and Soviet ideology may lead to modification 

> ) 




Lfjo^otA: rn^'O 






■ gor cEanHP" 

. * of the latter. An example is found in the February 1969 issue of the 

Soviet journal, World Economy and International Relations , which takes the 
most positive approach yet to youthful revolutionaries in the West. While 
it speaks of the necessity of their joining ranks with the workers' 
movement, it notes that the spiritual issues the students are raising are 

' > ' drawing the workers away from- their narrow economic concern and are helping 
to create the "socib-psycho logical prerequisites" for the revolutionary 
struggle. This attribution of an almost leading role to the students remains 
an isolated one, however, and Brezhnev's pronouncement stands as the 
official analysis. 

Leonid Brezhnev's speech to ..the international Communist conference 
on June 7, 1969, offers an authoritative statement on the subject. The 
rising generation -in the capitalist countries is in "revolutionary ferment," 
Brezhnev declared in explaining the "considerable attention" Communist 
parties are now devoting+work with the young people. He saw the young 
aroused by opposition to "imperialist wars," and "the militarization of 
bourgeois society." The negative aspects of the activities of the 
young, according to Brezhnev, are their spontaneity and "immature forms" 
and at times their exploitation by anti-Communist elements and "imperialist 
agents." Nevertheless,, he predicted that the young activists, once they have 
mastered the theory of scientific socialism and gained more experience, 
"will do great things." 

^ "■} The merefact that Brezhnev felt compelled to address himself to the 

•^ subject of student protest in the West indicates the. importance currently 
> assigned by the Soviet leadership to exploiting student unrest in the 
United States and Europe. While Brezhnev's speech did not represent a 
substantial liberalization of Soviet ideological approach to the 
revolutionary student movement in the West, it did mark a significant step 
/-^ in that direction. The Soviets now concede the revolutionary potential inherent 
mj in the student movement and are searching for ways to exploit it. Moscow 
f^J showed' some signs of a new flexibility which will certainly be reflected 
r— in the approach of the CPUSA, and it is possible that after further 
LZ consideration more effort will be made by the Soviets to devise an 
2£ acceptable approach to the young revolutionaries which will enable the 
Communist party to play the leading role it so obviously seeks. 

B. Role of Soviet Bloc Intelligence . 

Undoubtedly, as the number one target of Communist intelligence 
agencies throughout the world, the United States is faced with the reality of 
skilled Communist agents acting against the interests of our nation. For 
years the Communist bloc of nations have had diplomatic, official and 
quasi- official representatives stationed in their establishments in this 

Currently these establishments exist in New York City, Washington, 
Pittsburgh, and Chicago with a total complement of over 1,000 Communist 



CflLAJ oh- &%/j ' 17 <A £ C5 



top ennonap : 

nationals and^ about 1,400 dependents. FBI investigations have disclosed there 
are over 350 known or highly suspected intelligence officers or agents among 
them, of whom about 220 are Soviet nationals. 

■' In addition to this open of "legal" channel of intelligence operations, 
the Communist : bloc nations utilize highly clandestine "illegal" networks which 
have no .observable, contact with the Communist official establishments. The 
members of these networks who are sent here from abroad with fraudulent 
documents and fictitious cover stories perform intelligence collection 
tasks as do the Communist intelligence agents operating under diplomatic 
or official cover. 

A new component of the Chief, Intelligence Directorate of the 
Soviet General Staff (GRU) was formed in 1968 to oversee the collection 
of information on insurgent and dissident groups worldwide. Although this 
represents a significant upgrading of GRU interest in such activity, CIA 
believes that there is no evidence of any such GRU efforts targeted at 
the United States. This GRU component is believed to concentrate instead 
on the less developed areas of the world. Information available on the oper- 
ations of the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB), although not 
complete, shows no involvement with U.S. revolutionary protest organizations. 

The FBI also believes that in spite of the extensive efforts of 
Communist bloc intelligence operations to penetrate and subvert the 
^ , United States, there is little evidence that these Intelligence-gathering 
3 ■''' services are acting as channels for Communist support of the revolutionary 


^7 protest movement. 


C. Chinese Ideological Attitude toward the U.S. Protest Movement. 


UJ Through the broadcasts of Radio Peking in English and the distribution 

P"-*! in the United States of the Peking Review and other English- language 

I publications, Communist China has provided a measure of propaganda support 

— and ideological guidance to U.S. radical movements. Peking does not, 
*~ however, specifically tailor this propaganda for a U.S. audience -- it 
"""" is part of a monolithic effort targeted at audiences world-wide. The 
propaganda is couched in doctrainaire terms, concerned generally with 
students, youth, and black radicals. Attention to anti-Vietnam war 
activities, as to all aspects of the war, is slight. The ideological 
guidance, for those disposed to pay heed, is made available through the 
publication and rebroad-casting in English of Mao's "works," and through 
the innumerable rehashes of his "thought." 

Peking's exploitation of American student unrest, however, indicates 
that the Chinese view the subject as a target of opportunity- through which 
they can discredit the U.S. image world-wide. Their propaganda portrays' 



(jlLMOb-oty; (% O^Cj 



^ror OEcniff - 

student activities as an example of the "unending troubles which have 
brought the U.S. to the verge of collapse" and "progressive forces struggling 
■. ■ " against the capitalist system." Lin Piao has stated that, "We firmly 

support the proletariat, the students and youth and masses of the Black 
. : People of the United States in their just struggle against the U.S. 

ruling clique ."'."' ^ 

Chinese Communist propaganda seldom refers to individual U.S. groups, 
the single notable exception being the Progressive Labor Party, several 
■ articles and statements of which have been publicized by NCNA this year.. 
Apart from the general objective of. simply blackening the U.S., the 
fact that some of these students are self-styled "Maoists" probably increases 
Peking's incentive- to lend verbal support to such "progressive elements. 

Particular attention has been paid to the militant Black movement. 
In a very widely publicized statement on April l6, I968, "in support of the 
Afro-American struggle against violence," Mao Tse-tung declared that the 
assassination of Dr. King, i'an exponent of nonviolence," has taught the 
U.S. Blacks "a profound lesson." The nature of the "lesson was not 
spelled out by Mao, but lesser, routine Chinese commentators expounded 
the view that Dr. King's death established the bankruptcy of his 
philosophy of nonviolence and showed the Black masses and all "American 
revolutionary people" that they must meet "counter-revolutionary violence 
,) with revolutionary violence." 

^ During the U.S. civil disorders in the summer of 1967 , a series of 

^ People's Daily articles had applauded statements by militant Black 

> spokesmen and branded Dr. King a "reactionary lackey" who preaches- the humbug 

of nonviolence." People's Daily predicted that the "Afro-American masses 
S together with "oppressed strata" of the white population will isolate and 
^~ besiege the "handful of reactionaries who rule the country. 

The April 1968 statement by Mao, along with his previous formal 
statement on U.S. racial discrimination on August 8, 1963, constitute the 
r - c ore of Peking's propaganda on the "Afro-American struggle. The 
~ anniversaries of their issuance are observed through renewed publicity 
SI for the original statements, coupled with elucidations and updating of the 
<C textual content. The anniversary propaganda since 1965 has stressed the 
CO thesis that the Afro-Americans' "main form of struggle" currently is 

"armed struggle against police violence." At the same time, Peking has 
expressed its aversion to separatist trends, repeatedly stressing a 
community of interest between Black and White workers in opposition to the 
capitalist system. 


It is easy to see from the stated ideological position of the 
Chinese why revolutionary youth organizations in this country, Black and 
White alike, find it so easy to identify with Chinese Communism*. The 





$or cnmrn i 



Chinese are ideologically flexible on the questions of immediate concern 

to the youthful revolutionaries >, in this country, and the Chinese attitude 

toward the role of the students is clearly more sympathetic than that expressed 
"by the Soviets . 

For several years, the:NCNA has "been forwarding large quantities of 
anti-United States propaganda material to Negro publications and pro- 
Chinese Communist groups in the United States. Information was received in 
May, 1968, which disclosed that the NCNA had commenced circulating 
photographs in this country depicting racial riots, arsonist activity, and 
other civil disorders participated in by the American Negro. 

The FBI received informatioh on May 3, I968, revealing that a news 
release had been sent from China Features in Peking to the Black 
Organization of Students at Rutgers University in Newark. The news 
release contained a statement by Mao Tse-tung in which mention was made 
of support of the Afro-American struggle against violent repression. 

The Black Panthers make widespread use of the "Red. Book" (The 
Quotations of Mao Tse-tung) in instructing its members, with sections of 
it being incorporated into the Panther's "Political Education Kit. 

^ Chinese Communist propaganda is widely circulated in New Left 

^ and Black Power circles and the "thoughts" of Mao Tse-tung constitute the 
^ i heart of the revolutionary ideology of many of these groups. Chinese 
t ''' influence in the revolutionary protest movement in the United States is 
\ direct and significant; the Chinese are well ahead of the Soviets in this 


h»4 d. Role of the Chinese Intelligence Service 
[ — • 

Communist China, while having no diplomatic or official establishments 

2H m the United States, is posing an intelligence threat constantly through 
J? individuals residing in or visiiiig this country. Various residents or 
C/ ^ citizens of our nation who have Chinese origins or backgrounds have come 
to occupy prominent or significant positions in the fields of science, 
education, industry, defense and government. Some of these individuals in 
the past have acted in a manner hostile to our national interests, apparently 
motivated by fear or sympathy with the Communist regime on mainland China. 
However, we have no evidence of Chinese intelligence operations directed 
toward the revolutionary protest movement in the United States. 

E. Other Chinese Communist Support Activities 

In 1966, the Black militant Robert Franklin Williams moved to Peking 
from Havana where he had been granted asylum in 1961 and had been helped 
in setting up "Radio Free Dixie." Williams has been supported in Peking 

^ OF OEORIJff -] 




lay the Mao regime and has "been aided in the production of a Black militant 
periodical, The Crusader . The latter is distributed by mail to recipients 
in a number of countries including the U.S. The May 1968 issue of 
\ ■. The Crusader was distributed together with a special booklet prepared in 
Communist China- a few days after the assassination of Martin Luther King 
in April 1968. The booklet refers to the killing of King, cites the 
Black, struggle in the U.S. as part of the world struggle against the 
"Yankee imperialists/' and urges all people to unite and eliminate the 
U.S. capitalist system. The early printing of the booklet showed a fast 
reaction capability by the Peking regime . The booklet was prepared in 
English and Spanish. The Spanish copies were distributed in Latin 
America via the Peoples Party in Panama. 

Williams > who is the head of the Republic of New Africa (RNA), a 
Black militant American organization, visited Tanzania, the Government of 
which is friendly with Peking, from June to September I968 and again in 
May I969. 

In June, 1968, three RNA leaders, including Milton Henry and his 
brother, Richard, visited Africa to determine what kind of assistance RNA 
could obtain from Tanzania and what type of assistance they could render Tanzania 
in return. Prior to their visit it was believed that hundreds of acres had 
been set aside in Tanzania for the RNA to set up a commune and that Red 
China had land-clearing equipment and farm machinery to be utilized on this 
^ i property. 

> After their visit they indicated- that the President of Tanzania 

would make some agreements with Williams concerning commitments and foreign 
&_ aid to the 'RNA; however, these commitments would not be made public. The 

Henrys stated that as a contribution and to show good faith, RNA would 
O obtain medicine and books and send them to Tanzania. In addition, the RNA 

would assist in organizing the United Liberation Front in Africa which 

would attempt to unite all black African nations. 

Richard Henry has indicated that he wants to send Negro militants 
to Tanzania to establish a cadre for the proposed RNA commune. The purpose 
of this cadre will be to begin training blacks of the African continent in 
guerrilla warfare. 

In October of 1968 a group of American Negroes were in Dar es Salaam 
where they were allegedly recruiting an army to eventually fight against 
the United States and take over RNA's rightful title to portions of the 
U.S. These troops allegedly would be equipped with Chinese weapons. 
Richard Henry and Williams are actively recruiting for .this army,_and IT 
American Negroes are reportedly now active in the affairs of RNA in 





(^AJLNO^O^; cJA ^O 



top secret ! 1 

In September, I968, Richard Henry discussed the negotiations to 
establish, a Chinese Consulate in Quebec. If it is established, Henry 
) ■ stated, RNA will be able to legally purchase equipment through the 

consulate. Milton Henry, speaking before the National Black Economic 
; Conference in 'Detroit in April of this year stated that the black nation 
of HNA means : develping relations with friendly powers, namely, Red 
China and Cuba. 

• Another pro-Chinese American organization with strong ties with 
Peking is the Revolutionary Union (RU) which was formed in the San 
Francisco area in early 1968 and, after operating for over a year in an 
underground fashion, partially surfaced in April, 1969. 

One of the two founders of the Leibel Bergman, a long-time 
Communist who turned first against the CPUSA and then dropped out of his 
leadership role in the Progressive Labor Party. In I965, Bergman 
clandestinely travelled to Communist China where he resided for approx- 
imately two years utilizing a pseudonym. 

Shortly after his return to. the U.S. in August, 1967, Bergman 
advised reliable sources of the FBI that he had returned "to do a job" 
for the Chinese Communists. He outlines a three-fold mission: (1) 
to form a national coalition of domestic Marxist-Leninists sympathetic to 
Mao Tse-tung thought and the Communist Party of China; (2) to develop and 
"S ''' forward information of interest to the Chinese Communists; and (3) to recruit 
"> politically trusted youth who would travel to Communist China for an 

indeterminable period of cadre training after which they would return to 
this country and operate in behalf of Communist China in a nonpublic or 
submerged fashion. ' Thereis a strong presumption these latter individuals 
would be utilized as recuited intelligence agents operating in behalf 
Jj~j of China. 

~ In late 1967, Bergman indicated a desire to obtain intelligence 

H— relating to the Soviet Union which he would forward to China. He 
-gy provided funds for this, intelligence- gathering effort and also to support 
<F the operations of a domestic pro-Communist China organization. He claimed 
GO to have, a secret line of cd mmunication -with Communist China. After 

conducting diversionary travel to Los Angeles, Bergman flew to London 
in early 1969 and while there contacted the Communist Chinese diplomatic 
establishment on two occasions. Thereafter, he flew to Paris and 
contacted the Chinese Embassy in Paris on two occasions. While in Paris, 
he dispatched a letter to an address in China. Significantly, the .letter 
was directed to the name he used as a pseudonym while residing in China. 
He has stated he is able to communicate with the Chinese, but he is unable 
to receive adequate responses. Monitoring of his activities also indicates 
he is suffering from a lack of funds, which may cast some '-doubts upon the 
degree of active support he is currently receiving from the Chinese. 

TOP OE e niH 1 ' 


(^A/LA/Ofe-O^ .' *J of^O 




Although we do not have definite evidence of the degree of support 
Red China is providing either the Republic of New Africa or the Revolutionary 
' Union, we do have enough evidence to suggest that the leadership of these 
two organizations claim support and h old out to their followers_bhe_hope_ 
of substantial support in the- future, 

. F. Cuban Ideological Attitude toward the U.S. Protest Movement. 

Cuban media have from time to time publicized statements and 
articles by members of the Black Panthers, SDS, and such organizations as 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), although these has been 
a marked abatement of such propaganda in the past six months because of 
^ preoccupation with domestic issues. While emphasizing the theme of anti-war 
^ sentiment among the American people and in Congress, Havana does not as 
^. a rule discuss the role of specific groups or movements in opposition to 
' the war.. 

* Cuban radio broadcasts avoid detailed accounts of student activities, 

3 but emphasize that manifestations of discontent and rebellion by U.S. 
^ youths are symptomatic of the "sickness" of U.S. life and institutions. 
Havana publishes various propaganda materials aimed at influencing U.S. 
and other youths.. The emphasis is on Vietnam, Che Guevara and his 
idyllic quest for revolutionary endeavors, and is generally aimed 
at undermining U.S. foreign policy. 

In the only available commentary which has broached the question of 

, Cuban influence over U.S. radical movements in recent months, en April 

«"- 2 1969, Radio Havana set out to rebut a statement by Congressman -Henry 
Z; Gonzalez to the effect that the Mexican- American community had been 
«£ infiltrated by California youth of Mexican ancestry who had traveled to 
GO Cuba on trips subsidized by the Havana regime. The commentator ^charged 
that the Congressman was trying to make Cuba the scapegoat for problems 
rooted in the expansionist policy of the United States during the 19th 
Century and in the present living conditions of Mexican- Americans , latin 
Americans, and Negroes." The commentator argued that U.S. young people 
do not have to leave their country to learn violent tactics, since 
"violence is a characteristic of North American society,, but concluded 
fatuously that Cuba was "honored" by the accusation that it is an 
example and stimulus to those fighting the injustices of the imperialist 
system of exploitation." The commentator added the Guba offers her 
own example and stretches her friendly and firm hand to those fighting for 
a better tomorrow." 



In past comment eulogizing Che Guevara, the ubiquitous influence of 
his "example" has been emphasized in general terms. last 'October, marking 
the first anniversary of Guevara's death, Havana media cited his impact 


fl/ fr - r . SANITIZED COPY 






as a "political catalyst" in mueh of the world, specifically including the 
United States, and boasted that "never in history have the revolutionary 
'.■-.. ' concepts. of a leader of oppressed peoples spread so widely and so 
rapidly." . '-:■' 

Statements "by spokesmen for the Black Panthers and SNCC carried in 
Havana media have lauded Che Guevara and his teachings. Thus Frensa 
Latina (the official Cuban news agency) on February 15, 1969, reported an 
interview with two Black Panther leaders which appeared in Tri-continental, 
organ of the Havana-based Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples • Solidarity 
Organization. (AALAPSO), in which they acknowledged the inspirational 
influence of the Cuban revolution and stated: "We are happy to see that 
oppressed peoples are following the brave example of Che Guevara to create 
one, two, three, many Vietnams, and we will work together for the destruction 
of imperialism." In October 1968, Radio Havana reported that a SNCC official 
visiting Havana had said Guevara's teachings were deeply rooted among 
Black Americans. He was also quoted as predicting that guerrilla warfare 
would "increasingly become the method of common struggle" both in the United 
States and in "liberation struggles" worldwide. 

Emphasis on SNCC, and particularly its leader Stokely Carmichael, shifted 
during the past year to the Black Panthers. In^Havana press conference in Augusl 
^ 1968, a Black Panther leader was quoted in the Cuban media as alleging that 
"^ ) the direction the struggle was taking in the United States is that of 
resistance through guerrilla warfare. 

While Havana m^dia gave extensive coverage to Carmichael' s visit 
to Havana in the summer of I967 to attend the Latin American Solidarity 
Q Organization conference, he has received scant mention for more than a 
fcH year. Carmichael was interviewed by telephone by Radio Havana in April 
1968 after the assassination of Martin Luther King and was quoted as 
forecasting that "urban guerrilla warfare" would develop in U.S. cities; 
with Dr. King's passing, he said, "there is no Black man who will ask 
Black people not to burn down cities." 

Since- .Havana ' s "Radio Free Dixie" broadcasts to the United States 
featuring U.S. Negro expatriate Robert Williams went off the air in 
March I966 (Williams migrated to Peking), Havana has not addressed inflammatory 
appeals for violence directly to U.S. Negroes. But Cuban comment has on 
occasion continued to argue that violence may be the sole method for the 
U.S. Negro to better his lot. Thus, after the slaying of Dr. King, 
Havana stressed that with the murder "imperialism has buried its last hope 
for a nonviolent solution to. its racial problems." 

Although adhering to a generally pro-Moscow line, Cuba, has adopted 
a much more flexible ideological position toward the revolutionary activity 
of New Left and Black Power groups . By virtue of its geographical 
proximity, Cuba is able to exert more influence and provide, greater support 
to the American revolutionary protest movement than either China or, if it 
wished, the Soviet Union. And the fact that Castro began, his revolutionary 


r/ii^ §^°fj ; c?s <& s ^ 




• ror DECREE 




career as a student has increased his appeal to student revolutionaries 
in this country. Moreover, the exploits of Che Guevara, which have been^ 
widely herlded by the Cuban government, provide a "revolutionary example" 
for activists. in this country. 

G. Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service . 

■ Export of the Cuban revolution is the fundamental principle of 
Cuba's foreign policy. The FBI has determined that in the United States 
such policy is . manifested by clandestine support of Puerto Rican independence 
groups and the formenting of racial strife and student disorders. 

In September, 1967, two officers of the Cuban Intelligence Service 
(CIS) assigned to the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) told a 
representative of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico (NPPR) in New York 
City that Cuba was prepared to offer Puerto Rican independentists weapons 
and material. In April 1968, a CIS officer at the CMUN delivered to a 
representative of the Puerto Rican Independence Movement (MPIPR) a message 
from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. The message 
expressed the Central Committee's solidarity with and support of the 
MPIPR in the latter 's struggle for independence. Cuban support has 
included guerrilla training for some leaders of current violence in 
Puerto Rico. 

> An FBI investigation of Jesus Jimenez Escobar is an illustration of. 

^ Cuban efforts to forment racial strife and student disorders in the United 
s. States. Jimenez arrived in this country in August 1967 to assume duties 
fL as a First Secretary at the CMUN. He left the U.S. on February 20, 1969, 
at the State Department's request based upon the results of the FBI 
O investigation of his activities. At the time of his departure, he held 
the rank of Counselor, second in order of diplomatic precedence at the 

The FBI investigation determined that Jimenez was a principal link 
between the Cuban Government and leaders of black extremist, and New Left 
student groups in the United States. He gave advice and counsel to such 
leaders as H. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael, then affiliated with SNCC; 
furnished Cuban propaganda materials to them; and arranged visits to 
Cuba for unknown purposes for many revolutionary youth leaders. 

During early May I968, while in Washington D.C., ostensibly as a 
representative of the Cuban Government to the Pan American Health 
Organization, Jimenez instructed Stokely Carmichael to "continue to 
follow Plan A- 5." Carmichael was then agitating in Washington, following 
the serious racial disorders here of the preceding month. • The significance of 
Jimenez' instructions to Carmichael is unknown; however, an SDS plan of 
similar terminology resulted in an undisciplined mass protest and violence at 
Columbia University during April 568. 

js ot SBoniffi - 

f^- cC" '( 



/ 1 








The intelligence functions of Jimenez at the CMUN appear to have been 
taken over by Alberto Boza Hidalgo - Gat o, lower in diplomatic rank, hut 
superior to Jimenez in the CIS hierarchy (deputy head of CIS activities 
at the CMM). ■-■■■ 

Boza arrived in the United States on September 6, 1968, The FBI 
investigation of him has determined that he acts as a clearing agent for 
American citizens of various backgrounds who travel to Cuba associates 
with individuals who are affiliated with black extremist and New Left 
groups/ and has been operationally associated in New York City with , 
Soviet intelligence personnel. He ..acted as interpreter for Stokely 
Carmichael during a visit of the latter to Cuba in 1967. 

Cuban intelligence personnel are quite active in the revolutionary 
protest movement in this country. James Forman, International Director . of 
SUCC, is known to have had contacts with CIS agents, as have other pro- 
minent U.S. revolutionary leaders. We have successfully penetrated the . 
Cuban Intelligence Service operations in this country, so we are 
capable of keeping a close watch on CIS activities. 

H. Other Cuban Support Activities. 

^ i In the fall o -" in;:: ' 7 ^^^^^^ — , — Vam . noa - 

) _ I training schools for Negroes 

fe ^SSe^^oSScte^^b^St^^Siment to prepare them for 

subversive operations in the United States. 

S The identity of these sources was provided" to the FBI which subsequently 

^ located and exhaustively interviewed them. They appeared sincerely interested 
~" S JssisSng tht U.S. Government by bringing t o its atte ntion ^formation 
concerning the training school, and two of the ^HHi actually been 
Z Sfvicinity of Sant iago de C uba, where the training school allegedly 
■ ^s loclted. Jhe third ^^source ««"»** information^ parted to 
her in Cuba and did not'know how the information was originally obtained. 

When questioned closely, none were able to furnish data which ™&L 
substantiate the rumor that Negroes were being teined at the school for subver- 
sive operations against this country. 

Although unable to confirm the existence- of the sc hool the FBI 
nevertheless took extensive measures to guard against the infiltration 
of Cuban-trainSNegro agents. All local FBI of f ices brief ed selected local 
officios STo the'probfems posed by the use of minority groups in carrying 
out sabotage- on behalf of Cuba; key industrial plant officials were 
alerted to be on the lookout for groups or individuals within their 
organizations who were potential tools for use by Castro m subverting 
S country! and special questioning of logical Cuban refugees entering 
the U 2 instituted to determine if any confirmation could be obtained 





concerning the existence of Cuban training centers for Negroes designed 
to equip them to carry out sabotage , espionage, or guerrilla warfare, in 
I : the U..S. or its territories. To date, the FBI has received no indication 
that Cuban- trained Negroes have entered this country for such purposes. 
However, the. Bureau "believes this is a distinct possibility and is alert 
to developing information in this regard. 

Since July 1967 the Bureau has received voluminous information 
regarding political indoctrination,, instructions, and financial assistance 
being given by the Cubans to the black extremist movement in the United. 
States. Through its worldwide intelligence network, the Cubans continue 
: to attempt to influence and exploit the revolutionary protest movement 
in this country. 

A group known as the Friends of SNCC is active in Paris. This 
group has been engaged in raising funds and is attached to the Inter- 
national office of SNCC in New York City. Reportedly one of the links 
-^ between Friends of SNCC in Paris and revolutionary movements in France 
5< is an employee in Prensa Latina, the Cuban news agency. On January 
^ 28 , 1968 , a meeting was held i n the Residence of the Cuban Embassy 
V) '- — - — l ~^ ^— ^—^ 


^ , ^^^^^^^^^^^^^HHpPhe B 'cTA. regards the meeting as "an informal 

^ discussion" which did not "necessarily reflect Cuban policy," but when con- 

f~S sidered in light of all the evidence we have of Cuban interest in, and support 

qj of, the revolutionary protest movement in this country, I would attach 

r*sj a little more significance to it. 

~ In the Spring of 1969, Virginia Collins, Vice President of the RNA 

H2L for the Southern Region, visited Cuba. She attended a rally which was 

«^! addressed b 3 Fidel Castro and following the rally met with ham. In the 
CO conversation, he expressed a willingness to support the black people 
in their revolution in the United States and presented her with 
literature which he stated concerned the Cuban revolution and which would 
be applicable to the black man's struggle in the United States. He 
promised to send her revolutionary literature in the near future which 
would be of assistance. 

In December 1968, two leaders of SNCC departed from the United 
States for Cuba, allegedly to attend a Cultural Congress. ...When they 
returned to the United States, they were intercepted at the Canadian 
border by Customs and Immigration officials. They had in their possession 
a large quantity of North Korean, Soviet, and Cuban propaganda and 
souvenirs. Included in their personal effects were a five-band 

top cucmai ; 


(yntJO(*-Q$A: £% «£ 5Sr J 




portable radio of Soviet manufacture , adaptable for receiving intelligence 
communications, and a revealing notebook and diary. 

'■ Analysis, of the notes and diary indicates that the two black 
•■ revolutionaries were on a 'mission" on behalf of SNCC and this mission had 
been well planned in advance. 

Their effects also indicated they were placed in contact with the 
Worth .Koreans in Havana by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Cuba; on February 2k, I969, they flew from Moscow for Korea under the . 
cover of pseudonyms; in March 1969,.in North Korea they received detailed 
training in revolutionary theory and political and military intelligence; and 
they spent considerable time in the Soviet Union and Cuba prior to their 
return to the United States. 

Among their notes were instructions for organizing a ■ committee 
which would propagandize for the withdrawal of allied forces from Korea and 
seek the support of the New Left and domestic black nationalist movements, 
as well as domestic Koreans, to discredit the United States position in 
Korea. It was indicated this proposed committee would be supported by 
the North Koreans through contacts in Cuba. 

Additionally, it was indicated that the two Negroes had received 
, training in a likely assigment to accumulate intelligence on behalf of 

the North Koreans relating to latest plans, newest weapons, blueprints, actual 
weapons, if possible." According to the notes, these would be secretly 
§ transmitted to the North Koreans through the Soviet Union, the Tanzanian 
° Embassy, Cuban consultates in Mexico or France, or the Korean Embassy in 
Prague. One of the individuals described the assignment as 'We will be 
their (North Koreans) eyes and ears as we wage armed struggle." 




On August 19, 1968, George Mason Murray, Minister of Education in 
the Black Panther Party, and Joudan Ford, then the Panther leader in 
New York City, arrived in Havana. Assistance for their trip was rendered 
by an official of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations. 

Following his return to the United States, Murray talked of his 
trip during a Panther rally in Oakland, California, on September 5, 
1968. He indicated that on their arrival in Havana they were met by 
representatives of the Communist Party of Cuba and revolutionary guerrilla 
organizations from Asia and Africa. In a subsequent speech on December 
23, 1968, Murray stated that during his trip to Cuba he had been personally 
assured by Fidel Castro that the Cuban Government would give all-out 
support to Negroes in the United States.. 

I believe that the evidence is virtually overwhelming that Cuba 
is playing a major role in the fomenting of domestic disorder in the 
United States. Not only does the Cuban Government promote its own 

■ bop cEcmnrj 






interests by this activity, tut'' it offers a point of contact for the 
leaders of U.S. revolutionary organizations with representatives of 
the Communist governments of the Soviet Union, Worth Korea, and Worth 
Vietnam, as. well as leaders of the National Liberation Front of South 
Vietnam and other revolutionary Communist leaders from the "Third 
World,"; \ 

Although we have substantially good coverage of Cuban activities 
in this country and can monitor contacts between the Cuban Intelligence 
Service and U .S. revolutionary leaders which ^ take_pJjggg_jri : tMn_th^ 








QVt-A/o^°f/-; 3° * 






',.■'' ****** 

The intelligence community' has very little hard evidence to support 
the thesis that foreign Communists are providing financial support to American 
revolutionary organizations. In fact, there is a scarcity of information 
ahout the entire question of where these. organizations get the money to'- 
finance their activities. -. 

The community believes that they are able to finance their activities 
from contributions, dues, sales of literature, benefits, and advertisements. 
There is good reason, in my opinion, to believe that this is true in the 
case of SDS. I am less convinced that it is true of other revolutionary 

There is some evidence to indicate that the Progressive Labor 
Party (PL), is receiving financial support from Communist China and perhaps 
from Cuba. And there is also good reason to believe that the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) has at least on occasion received 
_^ financial support from Cuba. The sources of Black Panther funds are largely 
^ i unknown, although there is some evidence suggesting that the organization 
^; has resorted to extortion and bank robberies to finance its activities. 

There is no evidence that the Soviet Union has contributed funds 
to any New Left or Black Power organization. 

I i f I have been able to ascertain only two cases where the intelligence 

fvj community has "hard evidence" of foreign financial support of revolutionary 
r~" organizations in this country. 

SSI (l) During I967 and ±968, the Progressive Labor Party received 

^C a total of more than $13,000 from a European Bank where an 

CO organ of the Chinese Communist Government maintains an account. 

During I968, the PIP received more than $2,000 from Hong Kong. 

(2) James Forman, International Director of the Student Non- 
violent Coordinating Committee, was informed on December 27, 
1967, that the Cuban United Nations Mission was holding money 
for his organization and arrangements were made on that date for 
him to visit a Cuban intelligence agent. On January 18, 1968, 
Forman and an unidentified Negro were observed, entering the 
Mission empty-handed. A few minutes later each departed the 
Mission carrying a package wrapped in plain brown paper. 

■S OP oeoret ! 



0%J \ ' 3'K C&^ 




.; - TOT OHdttEEB 

On June -2k, I met with Phillip Abbott Luce, a former high-ranking 
member of. the Progressive Labor Party. In I963 and 196^, he helped 
; organize PLP-sponsored student tours to Cuba in violation of the then- 
existing State department ban on travel to that country. 

Luce told me : that he personally arranged for money to be picked 
up from the Cuban Mission to the United Nations to finance the tour in the 
summer of I963. He also indicated that when the PL students returned 
from Cuba in I963 and again in 196k,. the Cubans gave them a substantial amount 
of money to bring back into the country. As he recalls, the amount was\ 
$10,000 in each instance. 

I am generally satisfied that the intelligence community does not 
have any hard evidence confirming substantial foreign financial support 
of the revolutionary protest movement. However, I believe that it is 
quite likely that more foreign funding has occurred than the intelligence 
community is aware of. Luce's conversation confirms this in my opinion 
( it is interesting that no member of the intelligence community reported 
to me the substance of Luce's revelations, although he was debriefed by the 
Bureau when he left the PIP in 1965.) 

The absence of hard evidence is due, I believe, to two factors. 
First, the political sensitivity of surveilance of domestic political 
) organizations is so great the intelligence community has been reluctant 
-t>' " to conduct a vigorous collection effort; this is' particularly true of 
^ NSA, DIA, and CIA. And, second, I suspect that many members of the 
■^ intelligence community have satisfied themselves that there is no reason 
^ for outside funding and have therefore made only a limited effort to 
determine if, in fact, there is any outside funding. 


Q The largest and most successful revolutionary organization is the 

UlJ Students for a Democratic Society (SDS): There are many good reasons to 
f^j believe that this group has not received nor sought financial support from 
J— foreign Communists. It is not difficult for a broadly based ideological 
ZZ organization to raise $84,000 a year, which is the estimated SDS national 
~* budget, and we have reason to believe that several prominent American 

leftists have contributed large amounts to the organization in the past 
several years (two individuals are reported to have contributed $^0,000 
each.) Reliable evidence indicates that SDS is capable of raising 
substantial funds through contributions from its members and from the 
sale of its literature. In terms of immediate financial requirements, 
the organization appears to be self-supporting. 

There are several other reasons why I doubt that SDS has been 
funded by foreign Communists. First, SDS leaders tend suspicious 
of organized Communism, and although most of them are great admirers of 
Mao and Castro, I doubt if they would seek financial support from the 
Chinese or Cuban governments for fear that strings would be. attached which 

top CEonigr 


QlLi4ot>*oyi; 3a**SSj 



• flOP QEOiMT - 

would compromise their independent approach to revolution. Second, and more 
important; I am dubious that foreign Communists would regard the funding 
i . of SDS as: a good investment. American dollars are scarce resources which 
Cuba and Red China would spend only for the most compelling reasons and 
: where the benefits were likely to be significant and obvious. If SDS 
is capable of financing through its own efforts a successful revolutionary 
program, there would appear to be little reason for either Cuba or 
Red China to offer financial support. And, finally, I believe that foreign 
Communists would be leary of financing SDS because of the uncertainty which 
doctrinaire Communists must feel toward the anarchistic tendencies of the 
organization and its leadership. Were disciplined Communists to take over 
the organization (as the PL people very nearly did at the SDS national 
convention in Chicago last month), an incentive might exist. However, 
so long as the "Crazies" (those who profess loyalty to the principles of 
Marxism-Leninism, hut who reject disciplined party control, e.g., Mark 
Rudd, the SDS leader at Columbia) effectively control the national office 
of SDS, I think any substantial foreign Communist financial investment would 
be of minimal value to either Cuba or Red China, and I suspect they would 
share this opinion. 

The likelihood or advisability of foreign Communist financial support 
of the other revolutionary organizations is less clear. The FBI has reason 
to believe that there may be more than minimal support being rendered, 
aJ^ but it has not been able to turn up hard evidence to support its suspicion. 
^ Part of the problem, I believe, is the failure of CIA to devote its resources 
"^ abroad to this problem and the lack of careful coordination within the 

intelligence community to insure that all potentially available information 
is being collected and analyzed. This problem is discussed in detail 
>-^ elsewhere in this report. 

^H As previously indicated, we do have some evidence that SNCC and PL 

■—- lave received financial support from Cuba and/or Red China. And although 

iZZ we don't presently have any evidence to confirm it, I believe that it is very 

^y possible that the Black Panthers are receiving some financial support from 
^C foreign Communists. 


Virtually all the logical reasons which can be. mustered to support 
the argument that SDS is not receiving foreign Communist support are 
absent in the cases of PL, SNCC, and the Black Panthers. The latter groups 
do not appear to have sufficient support within the wealthy liberal community 
to raise substantial funds at home and their membership is not large 
enough or affluent enough to contribute substantial amounts through dues 
or contributions to meet budgetary requirements. More importantly, these 
groups tend to be more disciplined and more susceptable to foreign Communist 
control and influence. .."- . 

The Progressive Labor Party was officially recognized by Peking 
in 1967 as the only revolutionary Marxist- Leninist party in the United States . 
It has made a point for several years of claiming to be the official 

jdop OEoranH 


r/HLfJo^' ^ : i>$ of S C1 




Chinese Communist Party in the United States, and Luce told me that while 
he was in. the Party, one high ranking official claimed that the Party was 
i ; receiving financial support from the Chinese. In the last year, however, 
there has "been a serious ideological quarrel "between PL and the Black 
: Panthers over which group is really the "official" Chinese Communist 
Party, in this country, with both claiming the support of Peking. We do 
not know precisely how Peking presently views the two contenders for its 
favor, but it is possible that both organizations serve its purpose, and 
the Chinese may fund and support them accordingly. 

The evidence indicates that >the Cubans have also looked with favor 
on PL, but there is some reason to believe that . in- the past two years the 
relations between the' two have become less cordial. Castro appears to 
be keenly interested in the black revolutionary groups in this country 
and may believe thaijthey represent the best hope for a successful 
revolutionary struggle in the United States. 

Delegations of SDS leaders have made frequent trips to Cuba, but 
it appears that their principal interest has been to meet with representatives 
of Hanoi and the WLF stationed in Havana. We have no reports of SDS 
leaders returning from Havana with promises of financial support from 
Castro. The Cubans apparently wish to keep the lines of communication open 
to all groups which are sympathetic and the number of visits to the Island have 
; increased substantially over the last 18 months. On June 10, I969, a 

group cf 20 New Left, members visited Cuba and available information indicates 
"o* that all expenses over and above transportation were borne by the Cuban 
> Government. Another trip for a similar group is planned for this month. 

When Stokely Carmichael visited Havana for the Latin American 
Solidarity Organization (lASO) Conference in July of 1967, he was 
f^. treated as a hero by the Castro government. However, as is typically true 

Lu of Stokely, he broke with Castro over the question of the class struggle 
and he is no longer held in high esteem by official Cuban Communist 

However, the Cubans have continued to look with interest on the 
_*. development of a revolutionary black movement in the United States, and it 
CO appears that Castro has hoped to find within SNCC and the Black Panthers 

the type of disciplined leadership that can successfully wage revolution 

along traditional Marxist-Leninist lines. 

We have a report that Virginia Colljjas, a leader of the Republic of 
New Africa, visited Havana this Spring and met with Castro. Reportedly he 
told her that he was unhappy with the dissension among black extremist 
organizations in Los Angeles, but added that when the black"- people in 
the United States move forward in their revolution, they will receive 
assistance from Cuba. 

11 1 1 mi 1 Wl^M 








top DEortH ' : 

In. September of 1968, Irving Davis, a SNCC leader in New lork City, 
traveled to Cuba where representatives of the Cuban Government allegedly- 
told him that. Cuba was ready to assist SNCC with financial and other 
means of support in its struggle in the United States. However, before 
aid was: to be given", SNCC was to give concrete evidence of revolutionary 
activity in the next six months. 

• Recent developments involving the Black Panthers have cast an 
intereiing light on the relations between that organization and Castro.'. 
On June 25, 1969, Raymond Johnson, -who claimed to be a lieutenant in the 
Black Panthers and who is living in Havana, complained to the press that 
he and other Panthers have been "isolated and imprisoned" and want to 
leave the country. He said the "the Panthers have not been received in 
a revolutionary fashion; we have been condemned to live in Cuba." He 
also added that he thought there was racial discrimination in Cuba. 

ty\ ■ Tvo days later, Bobby Seale, the national Chairman of the Panthers, 

^ told a press conference in San Fran cisco that Johnson was_^nothingJbut_an_ 
^ ■ agent for the fascist CIA and FBI./" 

Seale' s prompt reaction to Johnson' s statement and his stern 
denunciation of a fellow black who claimed to be a member of the BPP 
suggests the importance which the Panthers attach to their relations with 
Castro. The BPP regards Castro as a revolutionary hero and comrade in the 
struggle against white imperialism, and obviously Seale did not want to 
risk jeopardizing his relations with Cuba by allowing a black malcontent 
tZ to implicate the BPP in criticism of the Cuban regime. Seale was doubtless 
S3»» also aware that one problem which the fknthers and other black extremist 
^£ groups have in seeking foreign financial support is convincing their 
CO porential benefactors that the investment will pay. dividends. Although 
less cautious and more "revolutionary" than the Soviets, the Cubans 
and Chinese are not foolish. They are not likely to invest scarce foreign 
exchange in organizations over which they have only minimal control or 
which are so distracted by internal dissension that they are unable to 
conduct a successful revolutionary program. There is little doubt that 
the Cubans particularly, and the Chinese as well, would very much like 
to acquire a strong influence over the black militants. It remains to be 
seen if they will be successful in doing so. 

Although the Communists would like to see a single, unified, broadly- 
based black revolutionary front, they may be forced to accept, the reality — 
at least for the near-term — of a series of small black 'groups struggling among 
themselves. However, the Black Panthers appear to have the potential 
for becoming a large and powerful revolutionary force, preeminent 



£>/la/ Ot>-otyi ; 35 *yC SS 'J 



• jpor cEariET 

within the black community. At'' the present time, it would appear to 
represent the best target of opportunity for foreign Communist exploitation, 
'. •. ' particularly since SNCC has diminished in influence, if not in revolutionary 

On JiLy 3, I969, Stokely Carmichael denounced the Black Panthers for 
its alliances with white groups.- He- called the Panther's methods 
"dishonest and vicious." It is impossible to believe that Carmichael 
would have any scrupples about the legal or moral virtue of a revolutionary 
organization if he believed it was following the correct road to 
revolution. . At the heart of his disagreement with the leadership of the 
Panthers is his refusal to accept the traditional Communist theory of 
the class struggle". He rejects this line, holding that the world-wide 
revolutionary struggle is racial, and the revolution must be waged 
along racial, not class, lines. 

Carmichael' s break with the Panther leadership suggests that he has 
lost this ideological struggle within the top councils of the organization 
(he lost a similar struggle within SNCC, from which he was expelled in 
I96T.) I tend to believe that the significance of Carmichael's attack 
is to be found in the inference which it supports that the present 
Panther leadership has opted for a black-white revolutionary alliance 
which adheres to traditional Communist theories about the nature of the 

"qV revolutionary struggle, i.e., it is waged along class lines. 


^ This analysis of recent events within -the Panther organization 

suggests that the Panthers are acquiring a rigid Marxist-Leninist orientation 
and are likely to seek and receive extensive foreign Communist support, 
,~^ financial and otherwise, in the days ahead. 

f^j In a report conspicuous for the absence of hard facts, the CIA 

^j declared that the "relative lack of firm Agency-developed information 
tl! on the subject may either represent the true situation, i.e., the absence 
22 of extensive foreign Communist support, or it may be a reflection of afLack 
^£ of enough well placed sources." I tend to believe that it is the latter. 
CO I sus pect, as do some high ranking intelligence experts at the FBI and 
| | that there has been more financial support rendered by the 
Communists than we know about. More important, I believe that there is 
likely to be a great deal more such support in the future as the 
leaders of revolutionary organizations recognize that revolution is 
possible only through disciplined leadership — and disciplined 
. revolutionary leadership is Communist leadership. 




• top secret 


# ' -* # #■ * # 

, In addition "to the channels of communication open to foreign 
Communists within the confines of the United States, leaders of the U.S. 
revolutionary protest movement have in recent years "begun to reach out 
"beyond the . continental limits of the United States to solicit the support 
of foreign Communists and revolutionary movements abroad. New Leftists, 
and "black extremists travel abroad .extensively and participate freely 
in various international conferences which are invariably attended by 
and sometimes sponsored by Communists. At the same time revolutionaries 
frequently travel to the United States and confer with leaders of the 
protest movement in this country. 

Cuba and North Vietnam have been particularly strong magnets for 
New Left protest groups. Much of the strength of these organizations 
derives from their ability to maintain close relationships and dialogues 
with foreign Communist establishments. For instance, the National 
Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) maintains a 
foreign contact list of over 300 individuals and organizations throughout the 
world. Its chairman; David Dellinger, has traveled to the Soviet Union, 
"0 s North Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Cuba and Sweden in furtherance of opposition 
-si' to the war in Vietnam. His relationship with the North Vietnamese is 
v: so intimate that last week they "insisted upon his presence in Paris before 
they woudl even discuss the promised release of three American prisoners 
of war. The State Department dutifully complied with this request and 
Dellinger was released from the cognizance of the Federal District Court in ■ 
f-*} Chicago where he is under indictment in connection with the demonstrations 

l_Jt_j| at the Democratic National Convention so that he might fly to Paris. 
SVJ The NMC and Dellinger maintain almost constant contact with the 
£Zl Governments of Cuba and North Vietnam (DRV) and representatives of the 

-— National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Dellinger feels -- rightly 
it appears — that such contacts give the NMC and himself notoriety 
and build their image in the movement. 

Since 1965 there has been close coordination and cooperation between 
U.S. antiwar groups and the North Vietnamese and NLF. An interesting 
account of the international coordination which culminated in the 1967 
March on the Pentagon is at Tab A. 

American revolutionary leaders are frequently in attendance at 
international conferences at which the strategy of revolution is the 
central topic under discussion. Frequently these conferences. have been 
held for the exclusive pitttpose of coordinating the ■ world-wide protest 
against U.S. policy in Vietnam. On several instances these sessions, have 



rj4 LAI G-ofj : 51 <& ^1} 



■ top moma '< 


lie en held at the request of the '•'National Liberation Front as in the case 

of the Stockholm Conference which took place in May of this year at the 

request of the NLF andDRV delegations to the Paris Peace Conference. 

Madame Nguyen. Thi Binh, chief NLF 'negotiator in Paris, headed the NLF 

delegation at the Stockholm Conference. Both the NLF and DRV delegations showed 

considerable' concern over the deteriorating anti-war movement in the U.S. 

and indicated that without public opinion in the U.S. calling for 

American troop withdrawal, their efforts to achieve victory would be 

handicapped. They urged those attending the conference, particularly 

those from the United States, to revitalize the deteriorating anti-war ■. 


An interesting and representative sampling of the international 
conferences attended by American revolutionary leaders is at Tab B. 

The ease with which f oreL gn revolutionary leaders can enter the 
United States has contributed to the international exchange of revolutionary 
ideas and programs. If the United States decided to abolish the visa 
requirement for foreign visitors as is presently contemplated, the 
-ii number of foreign revolutionaries entering the United States is likely 
^ to increase substantially. Information on previous visits by these 
foreign activists is at Tab C. 






Z§ Q^S 





* # * * * * 

Historically,, the United States has "been the target for subversive 
activities emanating from and directed "by the international Communist 
movement in an effort to foment disorder and disruption in a revolutionary 
vein. The change from the monolithic nature of the movement to polycentrism 
only served to magnify the problem in that it diversified the subversive 

Regardless of the diversification, the basic nature of the attack 
remained the same.' It emanated from Communist forces abroad and was 
channeled into this country through Communist-bloc diplomatic establishments 
and old- line Communist groups and organizations working to advance 
international Communism. 

From the standpoint of the FBI's responsibility to counter these 
subversive thrusts, there were two significant factors which enabled it to 
mount effective counterintelligence operations. 

The first factor was that the activities took place for the most 
"^ part within our borders. It was a situation which lent itself to effective 
> ) utilization of manpower for coverage and counterintelligence purposes. 

The second factor was that the activities were engaged in by 
organizations, such as the CPUSA, which were tightly structured organiza- 
tionally in the traditional pattern of Communist parties throughout the 
Q world. As such, they presented. clear-cut targets for informant penetration. 

Because these old- line organizations also followed the traditional 
pattern of operating under the concept of democratic centralism with 
an insistence on rigid discipline throughout party ranks, high-level 
informant penetration provided an insight into strategy and tactics 
being considered at all levels. Here, too, it was possible to effectively 
negate their thrusts. 

The emergence of the New Left and black extremist movements In our 
society drastically altered the situation. They evolved mostly out of 
social reform movements which increasingly have been transformed into 
hard-core revolutionary movements dedicated to the total destruction of 
our democratic traditions and our society. 

They produced a new breed of revolutionaries whose main preoccupation 
with Communism is that it has produced men like Mao Tse-turig,.Ho Chi Minn, 
and Che Guevarra, whom they hope to emulate in the overthrow of a system 
they deem oppressive. 




Tor sEortHP - 


QJ t/a Oh ' <&/ : 3fl A SO 






g or Dmnm - 

From the inception of these movements, the FBI has "been aware of 
the fact that their increasingly revolutionary Communist imprint posed 
new and Unique problems for the internal security of this nation* 

As these forces of revolutionary protest hardened in their resolve 
to accomplish their' purpose/ more and more they reached out to join hands with 
and seek support not only from old- line Communists inside our country, 
"but also from Communists and^archists abroad. 

In effect, the picture has changed from one in which international 
Communist forces sought out supporters within our country to carry out 
their objectives to one in which domestic revolutionaries are reaching 
out in search of support from anyone, including Communists, throughout the 
world who will help and support them in their own destructive aims. 

Since the objectives of both so clearly coincide, it is inevitable 
that they will join forces in common cause. The willingness of the Soviets, 
Chinese, and Cubans to support the efforts of domestic revolutionaries in this 
country has been demonstrated. In addition, the movement of the New Left 
and black extremist revolutionary protestors toward increasingly centralized, 
more tightly disciplined organizations will facilitate the inevitable 

>jv linkings . 

) ' It is essential that we bring together and intensify the intelligence 

capabilities of oUr country to meet this growing threat. It is imperative 
that we penetrate all the channels of communication between foreign 
O Communist forces and domestic revolutionaries; that we take all possible 
1-*J additional investigative steps to safeguard the security of this nation 
£^| in a time of multiplying and expanding crises. This has become mandatory 
h— because of increasing problems which may be anticipated in the future by 
~ reason of the growing alliances with foreign Communist elements. 

There are significant gaps in our present intelligence collection 
efforts which are likely to grow in the future. I am convinced that the 
FBI is doing, with the resources presently available, a fine job of 
monitoring the revolutionary leaders and activities which take place in 
this country. However, CIA coverage of contacts by U.S. revolutionary 
leaders with Communists abroad is totally inadequate. In fact, I am 
convinced that CIA has failed to assign an adequate priority to this 
problem and is not making good use of the resources presently at its 

From an intelligence point of view, we face several significant 
problems in adequately covering the activities of U.S. revolutionary protest 
organizations. ," . 

(l) Political Limitations . Since the exposure by Ramparts magazine 
of CIA use of American student and trade union organizations as covers for 
intelligence collection activities abroad, CIA has been forced to cut back 




- gor oEonur 



significantly its collection efforts in this area. Moreover, concern of 
exposure has created an unhealthy caution at CIA -which has resulted in 
too extensive a cutback. However, there are very real political limitations 
on a full-scale: intelligence collection effort. Many responsible 
Americans, liberal and conservative alike, are vigorously opposed to 
government surveilahce on the activities of American citizens. NSA is 
prohibited by law from targeting against the communications of U.S. 
citizens, and the public fervor over the exposure of EBI wiretaps 
has accentuated the problem. Public exposure of the fact that the 
Government is monitoring the activities of U.S. student and peace groups 
would likely result in an outrage on the part of a significant portion 
of the public. 

(2) Geographical Limitations . Most of the activities which we 
wish to cover occur in denied areas, i.e., in Communist countries. This 
poses serious problems for us even if the CIA^wer^making^^^i^^scale 
.effort to acquire the information we need. 

(3) Inter- Agency Coordination . The members of the intelligence 
community do not coordinate their activities in a fashion that is even 
minimally adequate. While I have found no evidence to suggest that one 
agency withholds information which it has available, I have found far too 
many instances where more extensive and valuable intelligence could 
have been acquired if the intelligence community worked more closely 
together in the selection of targets and the pooling of sources. I am 
convinced that the intelligence community is not taking full advantage^ 

^ 1 ^ — mm ^^^ mm ^ We are not getting all the 
information potentially available from our present resources simply 
because of inadequate coordination within the intelligence community. 

(]+) Utilization of Intelligence . It is not of much assistance 
to know what the revolutionary organizations are doing if that information 
is not utilized in planning appropriate countermeasures . I was surprised 
to learn that, although student disorders and mass protests have been with 
us for nearly a half decade, this is the first time any effort has been 
made to pull together information available within the intelligence 
community on the problem. However, even the most exhaustive collection of 
intelligence data is worthless unless it provides the policy formulator 
information upon the basis of which he can determine what steps should 
be taken to meet the problem of revolutionary violence. Currently, there 
are at least six staff offices in the White House, five at, the Justice 
Department, and half a dozen at HEW dealing with aspects of this problem. 
None are aware of what the others are doing and none have the entire problem 
in perspective so that a government-wide, coordinated approach to the 
problem can be undertaken. 





a/ 6' 

/ 1 

>* £5 1 



ffOP CBCmBP ' 


I believe that, after inflation, revolutionary violence is the most 
pressing domestic problem confronting this country. Yet, there is no 
\ in-depth analysis of the total problem, no significant effort to develop 

a comprehensive. program to deal with it, and no single individual, staff 
element, or agency responsible for working on it. 

Revolutionary violence, from student disorders to urban riots, 
is largely one problem. Yet, we have approached the problem much like 
the proverbial blind men and the elephant, feeling a leg here, a trunk 
there — feeling only a small portion of it, we have failed to clearly ■. 
identify exactly what the problem is we are confronting. The result 
has not only been inaction, but a disarming assurance that it is likely to 
go away if only we- recognize the "legitimate" grievances which we think 
it represents. 

I do not believe that a Communist revolution in this country is 
likely or probable. I do believe that Communist revolutionary violence 
is not only likely, but inevitable if the Government does not take steps 
to thwart it. Several intelligence officers in different agencies told 
me in the course of my study that they believe we are confronted with 
^ the most serious threat to our internal security in their lifetime. And 
^ the greatest threat is our blindness to the nature of what is occuring around 
^ us in the country today. 


I am convinced that it is possible to break the back of the 
revolutionary protest movement, perhaps in less time than it will take to 
end the war in Vietnam, if — and only if — all the resources of the 
government, including its ability to educate and motivate ~the private 
P-n! . sector, are mobilized in a carefully conceived and meticuously administered 
program. • 

The major difficulty I see in dealing with this problem is 
convincing top-level government leadership that we must adopt a program 
^ which couples the stick with the carrot if we are to have any hope 
at all of solving it. At the time we are putting the screws to the 
militants on the campus, we must simultaneously hold out some promise 
of reform to moderate students; at the time we are busting up the Black 
Panthers, we must be taking steps which reassure the moderate Negro 
leadership. This requires the closest possible coordination, and I am 
not convinced this is even remotely possible in government. 

However, we have a very serious problem on our hands, and it 
is my hope that an equally serious effort to solve it will be made. 



^Lt4o^cj/ i: '%^S*Q 









(1) On 19 April I967, David Dellinger was contacted by VIETPEACE (the VN 
Peace Committee - Hanoi) to arrange for a group of four to come to Hanoi 
"for some pressing discussions." Dellinger was given a list of people from 
whom the group was to he recruited (among the names suggested were Staughton 
Lynd, former Yale professor; Stokley Carmichael; Floyd McKissick; Dagmar 
Wilson; and a member of SDS selected by Dellinger.) 

(2) Dellinger arrived in Hanoi on 26 May. Although he had planned to stay 
a week, he did not leave until about 11 June. 

(3) From 6 to 9 July, representatives of VIETPEACE and the Spring Mobilization 
Committee to End the War in Vietnam (a U.S. "peace" group) met in Stockholm 
for discussions. 

(4) On 17 July, the Rev. James Bevel, Director of the Spring Mobilization 
Committee and also a leader in Martin Luther King's SCLC, contacted 

Do Xuan Oanh, Secretary of VIETPEACE, in Hanoi saying that he was "anxiously 
waiting reply concerning our Stockholm discussion" and suggesting that they 
meet for further consulatation "in Paris, Prague or elsewhere." Do Xuan Oanh 
replied "the problem has been discussed already, reported to the authorities 
and is under consideration." 

(5) Between 25 July and 17 August, Dellinger and Do Xuan Oanh had numerous 
contacts regarding arrangements for a large meeting of anti-war activists to 
he held in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia from 5 to 13 September. On k August 
Dellinger informed VIETPEACE that "plans are progressing well" and that he 
preferred to send the list of delegates and proposed agenda to Prague. A 

list of the U.S. participants was provided the North Vietnamese on 19 September. 

(7) Following the Bratislava meeting, a group of the delegates, including Tom 
Hayden and Renne Davis of SDS, flew to Hanoi, 




fNt-Hotgrti^! : ii3 o* SrQ 


NLN 06-08 / 1 p. 44 of 55 pages 

Ob~°yi : * 

xa±s a 

k2 t 



Numerous conferences throughout the world during the past fev years 
have evidenced both the international character of the revolutionary protest 
movement and the desire of foreign elements to influence the conduct of that 
movement within the United States. The majority of these meetings have 
focused on -opposition to the United States position in Vietnam. As active 
participants in these gatherings, representatives of militant groups within 
the United States have joined with their foreign counterparts in efforts to 
undermine the United States. A representative sampling of such conferences 
will illustrate this point as well as give some indication of the disruptive 
anti-American proposals made at them. 

1. International Conference on Vietnam 

Stockholm was the scene of the International Conference on Vietnam 
held from July 6 through July 9> 19&7- The World Peace Council, an inter- 
national Communist front organization, was one of the principal organizers 
of this conference. Among the k^2 persons who attended the conference from the 
United States were Dr. Benjamin Spock; CPUSA National Committee member Herbert 
Aptheker; the Reverend James Bevel of the SCLC; Amy Swerdlow of the Women's 
International League for Peace and Freedom; and Simon Casady, then an official 
of the National Conference of New Polities'* 

The conference made plans for a world "Peace In Vietnam Day" 
to coincide with the antiwar demonstrations in Washington, D.C. on October 
21-22, I96T. 

2. Latin American Solidarity Organization (IASO) Conference . 

In July and early August, 19&7, Stoke ly Carmichael, chairman 
of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, was a guest of the Cuban 
Government and an "honorary delegate" to the conference of the IASO held 
in Cuba. He sought to tie in the Negro extremist activities in the United 
States with the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle which was the basic 
theme of the conference. With head-quarters in Havana, IASO was formed 
by communist, revolutionary and terrorist groups from various Latin American 
countries dedicated to the violent overthrow of imperialism, particularly 
United States imperialism. 

3. Bratislava Conference . 

About forty representatives of various U.S. organizations (including 
the National Mobilization Committee Against the War in Vietnam, the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Students for a Democratic Society, the 
American Friends Service Committee and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference) met in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, with representatives of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the South Vietnam National Liberation 
Front. (NLF). 


Qjla/o<° "<=>$// ; </^ otssQ 


The delegates from the United States were furnished free lodging 
and meals vhile at the conference, but were required to pay their own 
transportation expenses. The U.S. group was organized by David T. Dellinger, 
Tom Hayden, and Nick Egleson (the latter two being former SDS Chairmen.) The 
American delegates were thoroughly briefed by Dellinger well in advance of 
their departure and were instructed to be prepared to give reports and 
participate in discussions on various topics, including the antiwar, student, 
and civil rights movements and an analysis of the current American political 
situation. Dellinger told the delegates that the purpose of the conference 
was to create solidarity and mutual understanding between revolutionaries 
from Vietnam and their supporters in the United States and that the delegates 
were chosen on the basis of their experience in radical activity. 

According to a Czechoslovak press agency report, the conference 
discussed "the future .development of the anti-war movement." The NLF delegation 
was headed by Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh (currently head of the NLF negotiating team 
in Paris and "Foreign Minister" in the recently established provisional 
"Government".) The Czechoslovak press agency report concluded: "The 
Czechoslovak Peace Committee provided everything required to make this meeting 
possible. " 

h. Havana Cultural Congress . 

In January of 1968, an International Cultural Congress was held 
in Havana. Five hundred writers, scientists, perfdrmers, artists, journalists, 
and educators from TO countries, including ^about 50 Americans, attended. Among 
the familiar faces in attendance were David Dellinger; SDS leaders Tom Hayden, 
Carl Davidson and Todd Gitlin; Robert Scheer of Ramparts ; and Linus Pauling. 
Five members of SNCC reportedly traveled to Havana to attend this conference. 
This travel was handled through the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN). 
The announced purpose of the conference was to obtain unity of action in Cuban 
ant i- imperialism fights. The final declaration of the Congress proclaimed 
that armed struggle was the only road open to the underdeveloped countries 
of the world seeking economic development and that "North American imperialism 
is today the bloodstained representative of oppression, misery, economic 
backwardness and cultural genocide." 

5. International Conference of Lawyers for Vietnam . 

This conference, held in Grenoble, France in July of 1968 was 
sponsored by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers ( IADL) , the 
international Communist front in the legal and parliamentary field. Closely 
cooperating with IADL has been a U.S. organization called "Lawyers Committee 
on American Policy toward Vietnam" (LCAPV). Among its leaders are William L. 
Standard and Carey McWilliams, who have been cited numerous times by the House 
Committee on Internal Security for involvement in Communist fronts. Also 
on the Lawyers Committee are well-known professors Richard Falk, Hans 
Morgenthau, and Quincy Wright. The five-man delegation representing the LCAPV 
worked closely with the DRV and NLF delegations, dominating the proceedings 
and drafting the meeting's final resolution. The LCAPV continues its 

QjLA/Ol,-oy f ; i/C of Sl^ 




activities, recently having published a "Five-Point Program to End the War 
in Vietnam" which it presented to the latest (l6-l8 May I969) Stockholm 
Conference on Vietnam. 

6. Japanese Conference on Vietnam . 

An international meeting sponsored by Beheiren, a militant 
Japanese peace group, was held in Kyoto, Japan, August 11- it, 1968. Approx- 
imately 25O antiwar activists, including 23 from the United States, were in 
attendance, Discussion centered on such subjects as how to wage a campaign 
against war and for social change throughout the world, how to deal with 
the Okinawa issue and the United States-Japan Security Pact, how to assist 
United States deserters. and draft evaders and how to coordinate antiwar 
movements around the world. 

Among the U.S. delegates present were representatives of SNCC, 
SDS, Women Strike for Peace, Socialist Workers Party, American Friends Service 
Committee, r and the Quaker Action Group. The CPUSA was also represented. 

7. Ninth Youth Festival 

The American delegation to the Ninth Youth Festival held in 
Sofia, Bulgaria, 28 July to 6 August I968, consisted of 85 persons, 11 of 
them members of SDS. The conference was sponsored by the World Federation of 
Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students (both of which are 
controlled by the Soviet Union.) North Vietnamese and NLF representatives 
were present at the Festival along with American deserters. W.E.B. DuBois Club 
members, although a minority of the delegation, effectively controlled it 
(reflecting Soviet control of the entire Festival preparations.) Great 
propaganda attention was focused on the U.S. role in Vietnam. William Cathbert, 
Chairman of the American Deserters Committee in Stockholm, announced that the 
Bulgarian government had financed the attendance of the American deserters 
who held several press conference's and appeared jointly with the members of 
the NLF. After the conference, and in response to a Soviet request, the 
delegation leader (also president of the CPUSA- controlled DuBois Clubs) selected 
eight Black delegates to tour the USSR. 

Contacts between Americans and other delegates at the Festival 
were confined generally to exchanges of greetings, exchanges of addresses, 
presentation of pins or souvenirs, and the like — all on a more or less 
formal basis. There was little interdelegation contact between American and 
Soviet representatives and what little there was appeared to be accidental. 
There appeared to be little or no socializing among delegations, even though 
several ate at the same restaurants. 

There were serious disagreements within the American delegation resulting 
largely from the leadership of Jarvis Tyner, President of the DuBois Clubs, and 
his assistant, Caroline Black. The SDS delegates challenged their leadership 
on several occasions, charging that they were partial to DuBois Club delegates. 

QjLKlO^OZA ; V7 ofStJ 





The SDS delegates vere labeled racists and accused of opposing Black and 
Tyner because they were black. Most of the American delegates found the 
Festival generally successful because it had accomplished the aims for which 
it was created -- "peace, solidarity, and friendship" — but claimed that 
this had been possible only through individual efforts of the delegates and 
not because of demonstrated ability on the part of the leaders. 

There were rumors of deep-seated dissension at the international 
level as well. Some said that there was trouble because revolutionaries could 
not talk and argue as they wished and that the moderates were in control. 
Castro and. Mao radicals found the Soviet brand of Communism too conservative 
and insufficiently revolutionary. They also classified the USSR as too 
capitalistic. ; 

Two members of the American delegation who visited the Chinese 
Embassy in Sofia were followed when they left by Bulgarian secret police 
who confiscated material picked up at the Embassy, including the complete 
works of Mao Tse-tung. No reason was given for the confiscation. 

8. Budapest Conference . 

Twenty- eight Americans opposed to the war in Vietnam traveled to 
Hungary to meet with representatives of North Vietnam and the NLF to discuss 
strategy on the U.S. campuses. The meeting was held in Budapest in September 
of I968 and was arranged by David Dellinger, head of the National Mobilization 
Committee. Vernon Grizzard, former national vice president of SDS and one 
of the participants, stated that this meeting centered on the Paris peace 
talks, on prospects of further student unrest, and on furthering unrest 
among U.S. military personnel. Grizzard stated that the Vietnamese gave no 
direction for activities in the United States, but they were pleased and interested 
in "our" plans. 

Nine of the U.S. representatives to this conference had taken part 
in the demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago only 
a few weeks before. 

9- Western Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam . 

From November 28 to December 1, I968, the Communist Party of 
Canada hosted a conference in Montreal attended by approximately 1,700 
delegates and observers, including a 5-man delegation from North Vietnam 
headed by Hoang Minh Giam, Minister of Culture, and a 2-man delegation from 
the NLF. 

This conference was first proposed by the CPUSA at a secret 
meeting of Western Hemisphere Communist parties during the Consulative 
Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in Budapest early in 1968. It 
was decided at this time to hold the conference during October when it would 
have the greatest impact on the 1968 elections. It was also suggested at 
this meeting that each country send 10 - 20 delegates, except the United States 

CH L ^0&oy/, VtfoGSSj 



top obqret 

and Canada, which would be expected to send 500-1000 delegates. Gus Hall, 
chairman of the CPUSA, stated that delegations should include representa« 
tives of anti- imperialist groups such as pacifists, church groups, and 
youth and trade union groups. Throughout the summer of 1968 the Communist 
Party of Canada (CPC) and the CPUSA worked closely together to set up the 
conference. A dispute arose when the CPC wanted to limit its scope to 
questions of Vietnam and the danger of U.S. imperialism to Latin America. 
The CPUSA, however, wanted to broaden its scope to include all aspects of 
imperialism, including its implications in U.S. domestic developments. 
These two positions continued to be a point of disagreement throughout the 
conference. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union contributed a substantial 
amount of funds to support this conference, but five prospective Soviet 
observers to the conference were refused Canadian visas because "the Russians 
had proposed an official delegation which would have promoted the official 
policy of the Soviet Union." 

The approximately 25 members of the Black Panther party (BPP) 
in attendance, with the aid of white radicals, took over control of the 
conference 'following a series of fights and scuffles. Together with other 
extremists they attacked, the "solidarity with the Vietnamese" theme. 
They wanted to assist Worth Vietnam and the Viet Cong, but wanted to 
denounce American imperialism in a wider context as well. A participant 
at the conference described the BPP members as "black storm troopers" and 
said no decision was made at the conference without consideration of the 
Panthers ' reactions . 

BPP leader Bobby Seale had originally been unable to attend 
because of lack of funds. However, his followers took over one session and 
the delegates "voluntarily" raised the money to pay Seale 's way to Montreal. 
He addressed the closing session and called for the overthrow of colonial 
powers. Seale also had a series of conferences with the Worth Vietnamese and 
WLF delegations. 

10. Stockholm Conference on Vietnam . 

The Stockholm Conference was held May 16 through 18, I969. 
Approximately 350 to 400 individuals from 52 countries representing a myriad 
of peace and antiwar groups were present. About 25 individuals from the 
United States attended. 

The conference was planned and requested jointly by the WLF and 
the DRV delegations to the Paris Peace Conference. Assisting in the coordi- 
nating and setting up of the conference was the Swedish International Liaison 
Committee (ILC). Among the leaders of the LLC are Carl H. Hermansson, chairman 
of the Swedish Communist party, and Dr. John Takman, Communist head of the 
Swedish Peace Committee. The ILC has been partially funded by the World Peace 




top secret 

The primary purpose of the conference was to promote acceptance 
of the NLF/DRV Ten Point Peace Plan among the world Intellectual community. 
The NLF and the DRV reportedly hoped thereby to use the influence of these 
intellectuals in their respective countries to develop world opinion in 
support of their proposed solution to the war. 

The head of the NLF delegation in Paris, Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, 
indicated privately during the conference that Hanoi was considering having 
prominent U.S. Black militants, particularly those opposed to the war, visit 
Hanoi some time in the next four or five months. Both the NLF and the DRV 
delegations showed considerable concern over the deteriorating anti-war 
movement in the U.S. They indicated that without public opinion in the U.S. 
calling for American troop withdrawal, their efforts to achieve victory 
would be handicapped. They urged those attending the conference, particularly 
those from, the U.S., to revitalize the deteriorating anti-war sentiment. 

Besides representatives from the NLF and the DRV, there were 
delegations to the conference from some other Bloc countries (GDR, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR). 

The American delegation consisted of about 25 individuals 
representing at least eleven organizations. Two Americans addressed the 
conference. Professor John B. Nielands, of the University of California at 
Berkeley, spoke critically on U.S. "Chemical Warfare in Vietnam," and Professor 
Franz Schurman gave a speech on "The Nixon Administration and the Vietnam War." 
American intellectuals in attendance included Anatol Rapaport, Noam Chomsky, 
and Gabriel Kolko.. American organizations represented included the 
■American Friends Service Committee, the National Lawyers' Guild, Women Strike 
for Peace, Resist, SNCC, National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, and 
the War Resistor's League. 

A report of the Working Group on Action of this conference set 
forth seven proposals to be used to undermine support of the United States 
position in Vietnam. These were: 

a. Collection of signatures of prominent people to be publicized 
in newspapers . 

b. National and international demonstrations on July k in the form 
best suited to the organizations and the movement in each country. Specific 
suggestions called for vigils outside United States Embassies on July k and 

the reading aloud of names of Americans killed in Vietnam. 

c. Boycott of United States firms providing goods for the war 
in Vietnam or engaged in the transporting of such goods. 

d. Increased international support for draft resistance in the 
United States and by Americans abroad; encouragement of defection from the 
United States armed forces; and, opposition within the Army. 



■ top secret 


e. Increased support of the 10-Point Program of the NLF and 
exposure of "the weaknesses" of President Nixon's Eight-Point Program. 

f . A campaign for recognition of the National Liberation 
Front of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by more world 
governments . 

g. The issues of the war in. Vietnam, particularly the unconditional 
withdrawal of United States troops and the 10-Point Program of the NLF, should 
be stressed as widely as possible at all national and international conferences. 

With regard to proposal number one enumerated above, the June 25, 
1969, edition of "The Washington Post" carried a three-quarter page adver- 
tisement calling for the President to end the war in Vietnam now. Specifi- 
cally, the signers of this advertisement, many of whom have had communist 
affiliation, called for a halt to offensive military operations and the 
withdrawal of all United States troops within one year to begin immediately. 

11. r World Assembly For Peace . 

The World Peace Council Conference was held in East Berlin, 
June 21-23, 1969, and was concerned with the following points: 

a. Unceasing denouncement of United States imperialism. 

b. Recognition of the government of the German Democratic 
Republic by the United States and other countries within its sphere of 

c. Encouragement to the Vietnamese to continue fighting inasmuch 
as they are fighting the battle of all emerging nations and this will give 
the latter the courage to fight their own wars of liberation. 

d. Support of provisional revolutionary governments wherever 
they occur. 

This gathering constituted the de facto Eight Congress of the 
World Peace Council and was a convocation of all international Communist 
front leaders behind a facade of some 900 invited "supporters of peace." 
The delegation from the U.S. consisted largely of representatives of the 
CPUSA, and CPUSA fronts, but also included such organizations as the Women 
Strike for Peace (WSP), the SDS, and the Black Panthers. The WSP representatives 
were also invited to attend the International Women's Conference which is 
scheduled subsequently for Helsinki, Finland. This is another international 
front controlled by the Soviet Union. Expenses for the trip to Helsinki are 
to be paid by the East German Women's Congress. 

In at least some instances, passage to the conference was being 
provided by the World Council for Peace. An Angie Dickerson was sent 20 
Aeroflt tickets from New York City plus two KLM-LOT tickets for Dick Gregory. 
Three tickets were sent to a Carlton Goodlett, and one to Herbert Aptheker. 

Q^LMO^of /: s/ crfSQ 







The virtual lack' of travel restrictions by the United States, coupled 
with the comparative ease in obtaining a United States visa, practically 
eliminates any problems foreign leftists have in traveling to the United 
States. There have been numerous such individuals who have traveled here 
in the past for varying reasons. Notable among these are Ernest and Gisela 
Mandel from Belgium and Karl Deitrich Wolff from Germany. 

Ernest Mandel is a leading member of the Trotskyite Secretariat of the 
Fourth International. He is also an activist in the New Left movement through- 
out Western Europe. His wife, Gisela, was active in founding the anarchistic 
Socialist German Students Federation (German SDS) in Berlin and is friendly 
with leaders of various radical youth groups in Western Europe. She received 
a rugged training course in guerrilla warfare during the summer of 1968 
while she and her husband were visiting Cuba. 

Ernest Mandel 's trip to the United States was arranged by the 
Socialist Workers Party (SWP) while the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the 
youth arm of the SWP, organized the tour of Gisela Mandel. These two individuals, 
during September and October of I968, made separate tours which took them to 
some 50 college and university campuses from coast to coast and border to 
border. Each appearance made by these two individuals was marked by their 
espousing the revolutionary doctrine of the New Left before United States 
college students. 

Karl Deitrich Wolff, a former national chairman of the German SDS, 
entered the United States on February 25, 1969, reportedly to engage in a 
speaking and fund raising tour throughout the country and did not miss any 
opportunity to spread seeds of discontent and anarchy. He cited examples 
of harrassment and disruption and- announced the need to build an international 
revolutionary alliance adding that a victory for the movement in one country 
is a victory for the movement in another. 

Wolff was subpoeaned to appear before the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee and during his testimony expressed support for the regimes in 
Cuba and North Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. 

A Black Panthers rally in Los Angeles on November 6, I968, was addressed 
by a Mexican student who was reportedly associated with the Student Strike 
Committee of Mexico City, which organization had been involved in violent 
clashes with Mexican police and military units. During a subsequent meeting, 
it was agreed that Mexican student leaders would come to Los Angeles to 
instruct the Black Panthers in disruptive tactics and that Black Panther 
members would go to Mexico for training. 

Q4LA/o(?-oy i; s j o*<rrJ 


TAB D 50, 




Black Panther Party (BPP) 

The Black Panther Party was formed in 1966. at Oakland, California. 
Its stated purpose is to organize black people so they can "take control 
of the life, politics, and the destiny of black communities." The BPP 
advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary 
program and encourages Negroes to arm themselves against the police. 
Its publications contain quotations from the writings of the leader of 
Communist China and feature his statement that "political power grows 
out of the barrel of a gun." - It is headquartered at Berkeley, California. 

Committee of Returned- Volunteers (CRV ) 

The Committee of Returned Volunteers was established 
in 1966 at New York City and is composed of individuals who have worked 
abroad in such programs as the American Friends Service Committee and 
Peace Corps. It has a membership of approximately 3,000 individuals 
and 12 chapters throughout the United States. It has been active in 
demonstrations protesting United States policy, particularly the draft and 
the war in Vietnam. Its leaders have discussed establishing contact 
with revolutionary groups, aiding guerrillas, destruction of existing 
governments and the transmission of information to Soviet-bloc countries. 
The CRV has declared that it seeks radical changes in United States 
policy towards Asia, Africa, Latin America and emerging communities in 
the United States. 

National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) 

The NMC was founded in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1966. It is a coalition 
of over 100 antiwar, antidraft, black extremist and pacifist groups. Among 
the organizations which participated in NMC activities are the CPUSA, SWP, 
SNCC and the American Friends Service Committee. The NMC has organized 
major protest demonstrations including the march on the Pentagon in 
October, I96T; the disruptive demonstrations during the Democratic National 
Convention at Chicago in August, 1968; and the demonstrations during the 
Presidential Inauguration ceremonies in January, 1969- Its officers 
include ■ David Dellinger, who has travelled to the Soviet Union, North 
Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Cuba and Sweden in furtherance of opposition to 
the war in Vietnam. 

Republic of New Africa (RNA ) 

The Republic of New Africa is headquartered at Detroit, Michigan. 
It is a black extremist separatist organization whose stated purpose is 
the formation of a black nation within the United States. It advocates 
the formation of a black army to defend this black nation and to attack its 

fMuJ U'Cfij/i : S i c& $%^ top c - EanET 



■ top oiioniin? 

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS ) 

SDS, which is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, was formed in 
I962 and is an outgrowth of the Student League for Industrial Democracy, the 
youth affiliate of the League for Industrial Democracy, an old- line labor- 
oriented Fabian Socialist organization. 

The founding convention of SDS held at Port Huron, Michigan, in 
I962, produced the "Port Huron Statement" which in effect provided the 
ideological framework for SDS, established the line of "participatory 
democracy," and set the direction for much of the subsequent activity of 
the organization. 

In the ensuring, years SDS has increasingly entered into the mainstream 
of revolutionary politics particularly with regard to its opposition to the 
American form of government. At its National Council meeting held in Austin, 
Texas, in March, 1969, SDS National Secretary Michael Klonsky stated, "Our 
primary task is to build a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement." The 
central appeal of SDS has been to the student. It currently has approximately 
250 chapters located mainly on college campuses . 

Student Mobilization Committee (SMC) 

The SMC is headquartered at New York City. It is dominated by members 
of the SWP and/or members of the YSA. The SMC has been active in demonstrations 
against United States policy. Its aims are to bring about the withdrawal 
of American troops from Vietnam, to end university "complicity" with the 
war, and to establish self-determination for Vietnam and "black America." 
It currently publishes the "Student Mobilizer." 

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 

SNCC was formed in i960 at Atlanta, Georgia, as a nonmembership 
civil rights organization. It took part in voter registration work in 
the South and was one of the moving forces behind the Freedom Riders of the 
early 1960s. In I966 Stokely Carmichael was elected National Chairman of 
SNCC. He moved this group from the civil rights field to a full-blown 
revolutionary group. Carmichael urged Negroes to prepare for a "bloody 

Carmichael was succeeded as National Chairman in 1967 by H. Rap Brown, 
who continued Carmichael' s policy of denouncing United States' intervention 
in Vietnam, calling for rebellion by any means, and massive civil disobedience. 

SNCC is a nonmembership organization which is headquartered in Atlanta, 
Georgia. It is composed of 50 staff members and a 15-member Central Committee. 


QjLA/06-O^ ■ 5^ o^Cj 




Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) 

WILPF, an international pacifist group, has its United States 
headquarters in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and has a current membership 
of 11,000 in 15^ branches in the United States. 

The WILPF advocates the right to self-determination, support of 
the United Nations, enforcement of civil rights laws and nev approaches 
to the entire social welfare system. The organization is currently 
urging abolition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System, withdrawal of 
United States troops from Vietnam, and the elimination of racial discrimination. 

Women Strike for Peace (WSP ) 

WSP is a national nonmembership women's pacifist group which 
maintains a national office at Washington, D.C. It has engaged in numerous 
protests against the draft, the war in Vietnam, nuclear tests, and the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile System. Representatives of WSP have been in 
contact with the National Liberation Front and have travelled to various 
countries including Cuba. 

rA/L^OG-o^; SS o£^3